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QUESTION PRESENTED
When a benefit plan, in violation of ERISA,
wrongfully denies or delays payment of a benefit, the
court may award relief because of the improper delay
in the payment of that benefit. The question presented is:
Should 'the amount of a remedy based on the improper delay in the payment of a benefit be based on:
(1) only the amount needed to redress the
loss that the beneficiary sustained as a result of the wrongful delay (the rule in the
Sixth Circuit),
(2) either the amount needed to redress the
loss that the beneficiary sustained as a result of the wrongful delay or the amount
needed to disgorge any gain improperly realized by the plan as a result of that wrongful
delay (the rule in the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits),
(3) the most analogous state prejudgment ,
interest rate (the rule in the Fifth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits), or
(4) the § 1961 post-judgment interest rate
(the rule in the Ninth Circuit)?
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PARTIES
The parties are set out in the caption.
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Petitioners Todd Rochow and John Rochow, personal representatives of the Estate of Daniel J.
Rochow, respectfully pray that this Court grant a writ
of certiorari. to review the judgment and opinion of
the United States Court of Appeals entered on March
5, 2015.

--------·---------------OPINIONS BELOW
The March 5, 2015 en bane opinion of the court of
appeals, which is reported at 780 F.3d 364 (6th Cir.
2015) (en bane), is set out at pp. 1a-73a of the Appendix.1 The March 23, 2012 order of the district court,
which is reported at 851 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Mich.
2012), is set out at pp. 74a-99a of the Appendix. The
June 16, 2009 order of the district court, which is not
officially reported, is set out at pp. 100a-119a of the
Appendix. The April 3, 2007 opinion of the court of
appeals, which is reported at 482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.
2007), is set out at pp. 120a-131a of the Appendix.

----------------·---------------JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered
on March 5, 2015. On May 14, 2015, Justice Kagan
extended the deadline for filing the petition until
An earlier panel decision, reported at 737 F.3d 415 (6th
Cir. 2013), was withdrawn.
1

2

August 2, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

--------·------STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary(A) for the relief provided for In
subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of
the plan;

*

*

*

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to

3
enforce any provisions of this subchapter
or the terms of the plan ....

--------·-------STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., establishes
detailed standards governing certain benefit plans
established by employers for their employees. The
covered benefit plans may provide such things as
retirement income, medical coverage, and (in this
case) disability benefits. Violations of ERISA take a
variety of forms, including wrongful denials of a benefit, wrongful delays in the payment of a benefit, and
improper actions that adversely affect the amount of
funds available to pay benefits. 2 Section 502(a)
authorizes courts to fashion appropriate remedies
for such violations. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
In fashioning such remedies, courts usually must
decide what additional remedy to provide to address
the consequences of the passage of time between
when a violation first occurs (e.g., when a benefit is
wrongfully denied) and when that violation is ultimately corrected (e.g., when the benefit is finally
paid). Often, although not invariably, that type of redress is referred to as "prejudgment interest."
The remedial:lssue presented in this case arises in a variety of contexts. For simplicity we refer to the most common
context, the improper denial of a benefit.
2

4
There is a longstanding, multi-faceted conflict
among the courts of appeals regarding the standard
governing the amount of this type of remedy, and the
rate at which it should be calculated. This issue
arises in the vast majority of all successful ERISA
cases, and it often has substantial financial significance; in the instant case millions of dollars in illicitly
gained profits are at issue. This Court has repeatedly
granted review to resolve issues about the availability
or amount of prejudgment interest, and should do so
here.

Factual Background
In mid-2001, the late Daniel J. Rochow was a
high-level employee of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., an
insurance company. Rochow was covered by a disability policy issued by Life Insurance Company of North
America ("LINA"). The policy provided for substantial
disability benefits if an employee because of sickness
became "unable to perform all material duties" of his
regular occupation. The benefits were available only
if the covered individual was still an employee when
he or she became unable to perform those duties.
In 2001, Rochow began to experience increasing
cognitive problems, particularly loss of short-term
memory. In July of 2001, Rochow was demoted because of the effect of that then-unexplained illness.
"[A]s a result of his inability to perform [even the] job
[to which he had been demoted]," Gallagher in 2001
forced Rochow to resign, effective on January 2, 2002.

5
App. 123a. By February 2002, Rochow's medical condition required hospitalization, and he was diagnosed
with HSV-Encephalitis, a rare and severely debilitating brain infection. In March 2002, Rochow was
placed in an assisted living facility where he remained until his death in 2008. App. 124a.
In late 2002, Rochow's conservator filed a claim
for long-term disability benefits with LINA. Rochow
supplemented his application with a statement by a
company vice-president who identified the material
duties of Rochow's position with Gallagher, and
stated that during 2001- while he was still employed
- Rochow "was not able to perform the material
duties of his job due to a lack of memory." The vice-.
president stated "that Rochow was demoted, and
ultimately terminated, because he could no longer
perform the duties required of his position." App.
130a.
LINA denied Rochow's benefits and rejected a
series of appeals. LINA maintained that because
Rochow continued to be employed until January 2,
2002, he could not yet have been disabled. It reasoned
that Rochow could only have become disabled after he
had resigned, at a point in time when he was no
longer covered by the disability insurance policy.
Proceedings Below

(1) In September 2004, Rochow sued LINA. His
complaint stated claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et

6

seq. ("ERISA"). Following cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district judge in June 2005 concluded
that LINA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
fmding that Rochow was not disabled while still
employed.
That finding was upheld on appeal. App. 131a.
"[T]he entire record ... confirm[s] the district court's
ruling that LIN.Ns denial of benefits was arbitrary
and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence." I d. Later in 2007, five years after Rochow had
first applied for disability benefits, LINA finally
began making partial monthly disability payments, 3
and it paid him a lump sum of approximately
$300,000 in partial payment for the benefits that had
improperly been withheld between 2002 and 2007. In
2009, after Rochow had died, LINA paid his estate an
additional sum of approximately $420,000 of unlawfully withheld disability benefits. Subsequently LINA
made a third payment of about $28,000, which, in
combination with the earlier payments, rectified most
of the principal underpayment .
. On remand following the 2007 Sixth Circuit
decision, Rochow sought additional relief because of
the lengthy delay in the payment of the disability
benefits. In June 2009, the district court held that
Rochow's estate was entitled to that type of additional
The district court later concluded that the payments that
began in 2007 were lower than required by Rochow's policy. App.
108a-09a.
3
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relief. The district court emphasized that LINA had
breached its fiduciary duty to Rochow when it withheld for years the benefits to which he was entitled. 4
The court made extensive findings that LINA had
acted in bad faith. It concluded that LINA had rejected Rochow's claims based on (~[n]on-existent policy
requirements,"5 had asserted a "[k]nowingly false
rationale for [denying Rochow's second application],"
and had sandbagged Rochow by waiting until the
administrative record had closed before asserting
that he was required to submit certain medical records. App. llla; see App. 42a, 59a-60a.
The district court concluded Rochow was entitled
to additional relief calculated as a percentage of
the amount that LINA owed Rochow, and that the
rate used should be based on the return on equity
that LINA earned during the relevant period. 6 The
4 App. lOla ("defendant had ... custody over [the] money that
it withheld from Rochow in breach of its fiduciary duty to him"),
105a ("[T]he court rejects LINA's argument that there has been
no finding of a breach of fiduciary duty.... "), 106a (defendant's actions were "a breach of the high standards that the law imposes
on fiduciaries"); see App. 76a ("it has already been determined
that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of loyalty and breached
this duty").
5 "LINA did not have serious arguments based in the policy
language to support its position." App. 115a.
6 For a regulated insurer such as LINA, the amount of
insurance it can write depends on the amount of the company's
own funds, referred to as its "surplus." The requirement is like
the capitalization requirements that limit how much a bank can
lend based on the amount of equity the bank has. LINA did not
(Continued on following page)

8

court held that this type of remedy was authorized
because it is "a type of relief that was typically available in equity and therefore is appropriate under
§ 1132(a)(3)(B)," which provides that a court may
order "appropriate equitable relief" for a wrongful
denial of benefits. App. 104a (quoting Parke v. First
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 100809 (8th Cir. 2004)). The district court referred to the
equitable remedies of avoiding unjust enrichment,
disgorging improper profits, and equitable accounting. App. 104a. (For the purposes of this appeal any
differences among those equitable remedies is not
relevant.).
The district court ·calculated the total additional
amount LINA owed by multiplying a rate based on
the rate of return that LINA had enjoyed each year
by the total amount owed as of each month. (LINA's
annual rate of return on equity averaged about 26%, 7

segregate the benefits claimed by Rochow in a separate account,
but held them in a general account which was part of the firm's
surplus. Thus, the total benefits unlawfully withheld from
Rochow enabled LINA to sell significantly more insurance, and
to reap the profits from those sales. LINA's Chief Accounting
Officer acknowledged that the withheld benefits were held in a
general account, the amount of which "formed a basis for LINA
to write insurance coverage." App. 9a; Hearing Tr. 123-24.
7 "LINA's intentional delay in paying Rochow's substantial
disability benefits for more than seven years allowed LINA to
earn millions of dollars in profits for its own gain.... [T]he district court found that LINA's average rate of return during the
seven-year period was 26%." App. 42a.

9

but varied from year to year.). The calculations covered the period from 2002 (when Rochow's representatives first applied for benefits) until the entry of
fmal judgment by the district court in 2012. The net
effect of those interest calculations was that Rochow's
estate was to receive about $2.8 million. 8
(2) On appeal, a divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit upheld the district court award. The majority
reasoned that § 1132(a) provides two distinct bases
for redress for a wrongful denial of or delay in paying
benefits. First, under § 1132(a)(1)(B) a plaintiff may
recover unlawfully withheld benefits themselves. Second, under§ 1132(a)(3)(B) a plaintiff may also recover
other relief, including additional monetary relief at
the rate sufficient to result in disgorgement of profits
unjustly obtained during the period when benefits
were wrongfully withheld. Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of
North America, 737 F.3d 415, 423-26 (6th Cir. 2013).
The panel also concluded that the district court's
calculation of the amount of unjust enrichment was
not an abuse of discretion. 737 F.3d at 427-31. A
dissenting opinion argued that under ERISA a plaintiff cannot obtain disgorgement of profits under
§ 1132(a)(3). 737 F.3d at 431-35.

8 For reasons related to tax law and certain Sixth Circuit
precedents, the gross amount of the calculation was approximately $3.6 million, but tax adjustments will mean that the net
to the estate, and the net cost to LINA, would be about $2.8
million.
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LINA sought rehearing en bane regarding
whether ERISA authorizes a court to order relief at
a rate calculated for the purpose of avoiding unjust
enrichment. 9
(3) The Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en bane
and overturned the decision of the district court in a
sharply fractured set of four opinions.
(a) The majority opinion concluded that ERISA
does not authorize a court to use a rate intended to
bring about disgorgement of the profits that a plan
wrongfully earned during the period when it was
illegally using funds that should have been paid to
the beneficiary.
The en bane majority insisted that ERISA is
concerned only with providing compensation to victims of unlawful behavior, and not with preventing
wrongdoers from profiting from their own violations
of the law. "The district court's use of equitable relief
under § [1132](a)(3) as the vehicle for its disgorgement award misses the mark .... [T]he award reflects
concern that LINA had wrongfully gained something,
a consideration beyond the ken of ERISA.... " App. 16a
(emphasis added). The majority held that the purpose
of ERISA remedies is limited to making whole the
Petition for Rehearing En Bane of Defendant-Appellant.
LINA also sought rehearing en bane regarding whether the district court had authority following the 2007 appeal to order any
relief that had not been included in its original 2005 order
directing that LINA pay the disputed benefits.
9

11
victim of the wrongful actions of the defendant.
"ERISA remedies are concerned with the adequacy of
relief to redress the claimant's injury, not the nature
of the defendant's wrongdoing." App. 15a-16a.
The majority reasoned that this restriction is
embedded in the structure of ERISA's remedial
provision. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The district court and
panel had concluded that authority to use an unjustenrichment-based rate is conferred by § 1132(a)(3)(B),
which empowers courts, in addition to enjoining
violations of the terms of a plan, to order "other
appropriate equitable relief." App. 104a-08a; 737 F.3d
at 426. The en bane court, however, held that relief
is· never available under § 1132(a)(3) if "adequate"
relief is already provided by § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that
an order under § 1132(a)(1)(B) directing the restoration of benefits is inherently "adequate" because it
makes a beneficiary whole. App. 16a. "[A] claimant
cannot pursue a ... claim under § [1132](a)(3) based
solely on an arbitrary and capricious denial of
benefits where the § [1132](a)(1)(B) remedies is adequate to make the claimant whole." App. 16a. Because
"Rochow's loss remained exactly the same irrespective
of the use made by LINA of the withheld benefits"
(App. 21a), it reasoned, the court's authority was
limited to compensating Rochow for that loss.
Prejudgment interest, the majority held, is permitted only at a rate no greater than that needed to
"plac[e] the plaintiff in the position he or she would
have occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing."
App. 26a (quoting Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan,

12
154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1998)). If, as the district
court had concluded, the profit LINA made using
Rochow's money was greater than the interest
Rochow might have earned with that money, LINA
was legally entitled to keep those ill-gotten gains.
(b) Judge White, concurring and dissenting,
rejected the majority's "blanket rule" barring a remedy intended to prevent unjust enrichment. App. 32a41a. She reasoned that under some circumstances a
district court would have discretion to set a rate at a
level intended to avoid unjust enrichment. Such a
rate could be used, for example, if a plan had denied
the benefits pursuant to "an organizational policy to
delay paying valid claims for as long as possible .... "
App. 39a. Judge White would have remanded the case
to permit the district court to apply that proposed
standard. App. 41a.
(c) Judge Stranch, in an opinion joined in whole
or in part by six other judges, would have upheld the
district court decision. The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's interpretation of § 1132,
and insisted that, in addition to make-whole relief, a
court under § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) may award relief intended to prevent unjust enrichment.
"The [district] court below got it exactly right."
App. 70a. "LINNs fiduciary wrongdoing and selfdealing warrant equitable remedies under § 1132(a)(3)
- an accounting and disgorgement of the considerable profits LINA earned on the benefits it withheld
from Rochow." App. 42a-43a. "The elementary rule
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of restitution is that if you take my money and make
money with it, your profit belongs to me." App.
70a (quoting Nickel v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Sav. Ass'n, 290 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002)).
"Varity Corp. [v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)] ... fully
support[s] ... disgorgement of LIN.Ns profits under
§ 1132(a)(3)." App. 43a-44a. "[C]ourts sitting in equity
'possessed the power to provide relief ... to prevent
the trustee's unjust enrichment."' App. 52a (quoting
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011))
(citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts,§ 95).
The dissenting opinion objected that the Sixth
Circuit standard conflicted with the decisions of the
Second, Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. "[T]he
majority opinion stands at odds with governing
law ... [:] Supreme Court opinions ... and cases from
our sister circuits .... " App. 45a. "[S]everal ... circuits ...
authorize[] the remedy that the district court below
awarded to Rochow." App. 68a.

----·---REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case presents a recurring issue that affects a
substantial majority of all successful ERISA cases. In
virtually every case in which a plan wrongfully denies
or delays a benefit, or in which a fiduciary engages
in misconduct that adversely affects the amount of
funds from which benefits can be paid, the court·
must determine what additional remedy should be
provided in light of the delay between the initial
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violation and the correction of that violation. The determination thus must be made in a large proportion
of the cases in which the beneficiary (or plan) establishes a violation of ERISA.
In most cases there are two distinct types of
consequences of a violation and the ensuing delay in
its correction. First, the beneficiary (or the fund from
which benefits will ultimately be paid) is deprived of
the use of the funds for the period in question; for
example, a beneficiary who has been denied a retirement or disability payment would be unable (for the
period in question) to use that money for his or her
own benefit. Second, the party that violated ERISA,
such as a fund that wrongfully refused to pay a
benefit, is ordinarily in a position to use for its own
ends the funds that it should have paid to the beneficiary, and thus to profit from its own violation of the
law. Courts disagree about which of these problems
can be remedied under ERISA, and about what
methodology should be used to determine the amount
of the redress.
Often the remedy is characterized as "prejudgment interest." But that phrase does not denote any
particular rationale for the amount to be paid or any
specific rate. Rather, it merely designates a method of
calculation: multiplying a rate (e.g., 5% a year) times
a period of time (e.g., 2 years) times a dollar amount
(e.g., $10,000).
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I.

THERE IS A DEEPLY ENTRENCHED AND
IMPORTANT CIRCUIT CONFLICT REGARDING THE GROUNDS ON WHICH
AND RATE AT WHICH REDRESS MAY BE
AWARDED IN AN ERISA CASE FOR THE
DELAY BETWEEN THE OCCURRENCE
AND CORRECTION OF A VIOLATION

There are two distinct types of circuit conflicts
regarding the appropriate type of redress addressing
the delay between the occurrence and correction of an
ERISA violation.
First, there is a conflict regarding what types of
problems can be remedied by a court in fashioning
the rate to be used in addressing that delay. Five
circuits hold that relief to address that delay can be
based on either (or both) of two distinct justifications:
the extent to which the delay itself has injured the
beneficiary, and the extent to which the plan has
profited from the use of the unlawfully withheld
funds. The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, insists
that only the first, make-whole factor can be considered. The appropriate rationale necessarily determines the rate at which additional relief (such as
prejudgment interest) would be calculated. 10

Hizer v. General Motors Corp., Allison Gas Turbine Diu.,
888 F.Supp. 1453, 1462 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("Just as case law dealing with prejudgment interest provide[s] guidance as to whether
interest on delayed payment is available at all, it also provides
guidance in calculating that interest."); Jones v. Unum Life Ins.
Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) ("the same
(Continued on following page)
10
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Second, another set of circuits has adopted per
se rules, not based on a case-specific application of
either factor, for setting that rate. Three circuits
utilize the most analogous prejudgment interest rate
of the state in which the claim arose. One circuit
uses the post-judgment interest rate in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a). Neither of these types of rates is tied to the
level needed to provide make-whole relief for a particular beneficiary or to prevent unjust enrichment of
a particular wrongdoer.
This conflict regularly and predictably leads to
substantial and unjustifiable differences in the remedy provided when a plan has wrongfully refused to
pay a required benefit. For example, as we explain
below, in a case arising in Oklahoma, the federal
courts (using the Oklahoma prejudgment rate) calculate additional redress at a rate of 15%, whereas
federal courts in the Ninth Circuit (which utilizes
§ 1961) today routinely use a rate of 0.27%.

A. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LIMITS REMEDIES TO THE AMOUNT NEEDED TO
MAKE THE BENEFICIARY WHOLE
The en bane Sixth Circuit decision establishes a
clear, and unprecedented, limitation on the authority
of federal courts to provide remedies for violations of
considerations that inform the court's decision whether or not to
award interest at all should inform the court's choice of interest
rate.").
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ERISA. As the decision below makes clear, courts in
that circuit may not - in addition to ordering payment of improperly withheld benefits- adopt a remedy intended to prevent unjust enrichment on the
part of a plan or fiduciary who violated federal law.
The district court finding "that LINA had wrongfully
gained something" - in the district court's calculation,
over $2.8 million - was, in the words of the Sixth
Circuit, "a consideration beyond the ken of ERISA."
App. 16a.
The en bane court imposed this restriction in two
distinct ways. First, it held that the award ordered by
the district court was impermissible because its very
purpose - the prevention of unjust enrichment - was
outside the authority of the court. The remedial authority of the district court under ERISA ended, the
Sixth Circuit held, once it had provided make-whole
relief to Rochow. App. lla-25a. A court is restricted
to compensating the victim for his or her loss, and
Rochow's "loss remained exactly the same irrespective
of the use made by LINA of the withheld benefits."
App. 21a.
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the award of
prejudgment interest must be limited to the amount
necessary to compensate the beneficiary for his or her
losses arising out of the delay in payment. "An award
of interest should 'simply compensate a beneficiary
for the lost interest value of money wrongfully withheld from him or her.'" App. 26a (quoting Rybarczyk
v. TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 985 (6th Cir. 2000)).
"Awards of prejudgment interest are compensatory ...."
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App. 26a (emphasis in original). Prejudgment interest
· larger than that amount - such as interest based on a
higher rate to avoid unjust enrichment - "would
'contravene ERIS.Ns remedial goal of simply placing
the plaintiff in the position he or she would have
occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing.'" App.
27a (quoting Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Retirement Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 686
(6th Cir. 2013)). The court remanded the case to
permit the district court to decide only whether an
"award of prejudgment interest is warranted under
§ [1132](a)(1)(B) to make Rochow whole." App. 28a.

B. FIVE CIRCUITS AUTHORIZE REMEDIES INTENDED TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Five circuits expressly apply the contrary rule,
permitting a district court to consider the need to
avoid unjust enrichment in framing a remedial order.11 Indeed, those circuits expressly instruct district
courts to consider the danger of unjust enrichment in
framing such remedies. In the Third, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits, the courts of appeals have upheld
The Department of Labor takes the position that ERISA
remedies may be framed to prevent unjust enrichment. Joint
Merits Response Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee and Appellee, Chao
v. Consulting Fiduciaries, Inc., Nos. 08-1228 and 08-2254 (7th
Cir.), available at 2008 WL 4212720 at *47 ("prejudgment
interest is necessary not only to fully compensate the victim but
also to prevent unjust enrichment.").
11

19
awards of prejudgment interest in cases in which it
was not needed to make the beneficiary whole. In the
Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits, the remedy ordered in this case
would have been upheld, and LINA would not have
been permitted to retain the millions of dollars in
profits at issue.
The Third Circuit has repeatedly made clear that
courts may frame ERISA remedies for the purpose
of avoiding unjust enrichment. Skredtvedt v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2004), in
an opinion joined by then-Judge Alito, explained that
the purposes of prejudgment interest itself are both
"making the claimant whole and preventing unjust
enrichment." 372 F.3d at 209. 12 Fotta v. Trustees of
United Mine Workers of America, 165 F.3d 209, 211
(3d Cir. 1998), also held that where benefits have
been wrongfully denied, prejudgment interest is
awarded because "[t]o allow the Fund to retain the
interest it earned on funds wrongfully withheld
would be to approve of unjust enrichment. Further,
the relief granted would fall short of making [the
claimant] whole because he has been denied the use
of money that was his." 165 F.3d at 212 (quoting
Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
12 "[M]aking the claimant whole and unjust enrichment are
concerns equally present ... where benefits have been awarded
pursuant to a judgment and where benefits have been withheld
but are ultimately awarded without resort to a judgment." I d. at
209.
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Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 576 (8th Cir. 1984)).13
Anthuis v. Cold Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d
999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992), held that "[a]warding prejudgment interest is intended to serve at least two
purposes: to compensate prevailing parties for the true
costs of money damages incurred, and ... to promote
settlement and deter attempts to benefit from the
inherent delays of litigation." (Quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750
(8th Cir. 1986)). National Security Systems, Inc. v.
lola, 700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2012), upheld an award of
prejudgment interest even though it was not needed
or justifiable as a remedy to make the beneficiaries
whole, the only permissible justification in the Sixth
Circuit. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's
contention "that because the District Court found that
prejudgment interest was not needed to make the
plaintiffs whole, they should not have been awarded
interest .... That argument neglects that prejudgment
interest aims to make plaintiffs whole and to prevent
unjust enrichment." 700 F.3d at 103 (emphasis In
original). 14 That is precisely the interpretation of
§ 1132(a) rejected by the Sixth Circuit below.
13 "[T]he concerns animating [the award of prejudgment interest are] ... making the clahnant whole and preventing unjust
enrichment." I d. at 213. "[T]he awarding of interest where benefits have been unjustifiably delayed not only ensures full compensation, but also serves to prevent unjust enrichment." ld.
14 See 700 F.3d at 102 ("[p]rejudgment interest exists to
make plaintiffs whole and to preclude defendants from garnering unjust enrichment.").
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The Seventh Circuit agrees that prejudgment
interest or other relief can be awarded for the purpose
of avoiding unjust enrichment. "Prejudgment interest
is designed not only to fully compensate the victim,
but also to prevent unjust enrichment." Trustmark
Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago Hospital, 207
F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir. 2000).
[Without prejudgment interest] there is incomplete compensation to victims of wrongdoing and there are added incentives to
resist and delay the bringing of the wrongdoer to book.... The award of prejudgment interest is necessary for full compensation of
the victims of wrongdoing .... Moreover, the
award of prejudgment interest has an independent ground ... : the principle of unjust
enrichment.... The retirement plan [in this
case] held money that belonged to [the plaintiff] - held it on her account, as it were ....
[T]he plan mu~t return it to her together
with the fruits that it has gleaned by holding
on to it.

Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir. 1990).
The requirement that a wrongdoer return to its
victim the fruits it gleaned by that violation is in
other Seventh Circuit cases referred to as "restitution
of wrongful gain" or a constructive trust. Clair v.
Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498
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(7th Cir. 1999). 15 That remedy, however labeled, can
be awarded even if the victim sustained no loss as a
result of the wrongful delay in the payment of a
benefit. In Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991), for example, the Seventh
Circuit rejected a contention that a plan that had
wrongfully refused to pay medical bills should not pay
prejudgment interest because the victim himself had
not paid those bills, and thus had not lost the use of
the funds needed to do so.
The premise of defendants' argument is that
the plaintiffs did not pay the medical bills at
issue and therefore they did not forego the
use of the money. However, ... prejudgment
interest is designed not only to fully compensate the victim, but also to prevent unjust
enrichment .... The ability of defendants to
earn interest on funds which should have
been expended to pay plaintiffs' medical benefits under the policy would result in the unjust enrichment of defendants. Relieving
defendants from the payment of prejudgment
interest would create an incentive for insurers to delay payments and would under compensate victims by forcing them to absorb
expenses incurred as a result of the delay.

See May Department Stores Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.,
305 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2002) ("unjust enrichment is a basis,
indeed the usual basis, for imposing a constructive trust on a
sum of money.").
15
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921 F.2d at 696-97; see Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.3d 113,
122 (7th Cir. 1984) ("ERISA clearly contemplates actions against fiduciaries who profit by using trust
assets, even where the plan beneficiaries do not suffer
direct financial loss.").
In the Eighth Circuit, avoidance of unjust enrichment is the primary purpose of prejudgment
interest or other remedies that transfer to the victim
profits illicitly earned by the wrongdoer. "A common
thread throughout the prejudgment interest cases is
unjust enrichment - the wrongdoer should not be
allowed to use the withheld benefits or retain interest
earned on the funds during the time of the dispute .... "
Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F. 3d 938, 946
(8th Cir. 1999); see Short, 729 F.3d at 576 ("To allow
the Fund to retain the interest it earned on funds
wrongfully withheld would be to approve of unjust
enrichment. Further, the relief granted would fall
short of making [the beneficiary] whole because he
has been denied the use of money which was his.").
Opinions in this circuit at times characterize these
remedies as an accounting for profits or the imposition of a constructive trust.
In the particular context of withheld benefits
under ERISA, we conclude that interest is an
appropriate measure of the profits made by a
defendant who breaches its fiduciary duty to
a defendant .... Interest is, in many respects,
the only way to measure of the extent to
which [a wrongdoer] was unjustly enriched.
We emphasize that the purpose of this award
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is to prevent [the wrongdoer] from profiting
by its breach of fiduciary duty and not to
compensate [the victim] for the delay in
payment.

Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368
F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 16 For
this reason, in the Eighth Circuit prejudgment interest can be awarded even though the victim experienced no injury as a result of the delay in payment of
a benefit. 17 The Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the
16

See id. at 1007 ("interest is an appropriate remedy under

§ 1132(a)(3)(B) to avoid unjust enrichment of a plan provider

who wrongfully delays the payment of benefits.").
17 In Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1330-31
(8th Cir. 1995), "TMG argue[d] that there is no equitable basis
for prejudgment interest in the present case because appellee
has not yet paid the hospital bills and has not been charged
interest. Thus, TMG contend[ed], prejudgment interest is not
necessary to make appellee whole and would simply constitute a
windfall." 54 F.3d at 1330. The court upheld the award of
prejudgment interest to assure that the plan would not ''benefit
unfairly from ... [the] delays."
Christianson v. Poly-America, Inc. Medical Benefit Plan, 412
F.3d 935, 941 (8th Cir. 2005), involved a similar situation and
holding:
According to Poly-America, the award of prejudgment
interest constitutes a windfall to Christianson ... because Christianson never spent any of Christianson's
money to pay medical costs.
We believe that Poly-America's argument misconstrues the purpose of prejudgment interest.... [W]hile
one purpose of the remedy is to compensate the prevailing party for financial damages occurred, ... another
important purpose is to "promote settlement and
deter attempts to benefit unfairly from the inherent
(Continued on following page)
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ERISA remedial scheme is thus essentially the opposite of the Sixth Circuit rule, which recognizes only
compensation as a legitimate basis for an award of
prejudgment interest.
The Second Circuit directs the lower courts to
consider both compensation and the avoidance of unjust enrichment in fashioning a remedy for delay.
Thus in Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128,
150 (2d Cir. 2011), the court of appeals upheld the
prejudgment rate imposed by the district court as
"entirely consistent with the principle that plaintiffs
should be 'made whole' and that defendants should
'not profit by their failure to comply with their ERISA
obligations.'" (quoting Algie v. RCA Global Commc'ns,
Inc., 891 F.Supp. 875, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Another
Second Circuit opinion instructed the district court to
"consider whether the plaintiff would have invested
the money at some higher rate [than the Treasury bill
rate] ... ; or it may take into account the rate of interest the defendant would have had to pay to borrow
the money it withheld from the plaintiff.... " Jones v.
delays of litigation." Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 752 (8th Cir. [] 1986). A
common thread throughout the prejudgment interest
cases is unjust enrichment - the wrongdoer should
not be allowed to use the withheld benefits or retain
interest earned on the funds during the time of the
dispute. Kerr, 184 F.3d at 946. Regardless of whether
Christianson spent his own money, Poly-America does
not dispute that Poly-America retained the use of the
funds during the dispute.

26

Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d
Cir. 2000). Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F. 3d
223, 230 (2d Cir. 2002), warned that unless remedied
"[an unjustified] delay enriches the fiduciary at the
expense of the beneficiary."
The District of Columbia Circuit also recognizes
that preventing unjust enrichment is a legitimate
purpose of an award of prejudgment interest, and
thus a basis for determining the amount of such an
award.
The presumption in favor of prejudgment interest has three recognized bases. First, to
permit the fiduciary to retain the interest
earned on wrongfully withheld . benefits
would amount to unjust enrichment - a fiduciary would benefit from failing to pay
ERISA benefits .... Second, prejudgment interest ensures that a beneficiary is fully
compensated, including for the loss of the use
of money that is his .... Finally, prejudgment
interest promotes settlement and deters any
attempt to benefit unfairly from inevitable
litigation delay.

Moore v. CapitalCare Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.
2006).

C. THREE CIRCUITS UTILIZE STATE
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATES
In three circuits, federal courts presumptively
apply state prejudgment interest statutes in determining the rate for prejudgment interest in ERISA
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cases, an approach that does not consider either the
rate needed to make the beneficiary whole or the rate
needed to prevent unjust enrichment. The Sixth
Circuit disapproves of this practice.
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly advised district
courts to look to state law in determining the prejudgment interest rate for ERISA claims. Transitional
Learning Center at Galveston v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 1996 WL 625412 at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 1996)
(courts "consult [state law] for guidance in assessing
prejudgment interest in ERISA claims .... "); Hansen v.
Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 984-85 (5th Cir.
1991) ("state law ... provides guidance [in fixing the
prejudgment interest rate in ERISA claims]"). District courts in the Fifth Circuit regularly apply statelaw prejudgment interest rates in ERISA cases; we
set out a list of such cases in the Appendix. App.
132a-33a.
In the Tenth Circuit "[c]ourts commonly look to
state statutory prejudgment interest provisions as
guidelines for a reasonable rate." Weber v. GE Group
Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1016 (lOth Cir.
2008). Garrett v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 557
Fed.Appx. 734, 738 (lOth Cir. 2014), upheld the use in
ERISA cases of the 15% prejudgment interest rate
established by Oklahoma statute. "[W]e have approved of the use of the relevant state's statutory
prejudgment interest rate, including Oklahoma's, as
appropriate in ERISA cases as long as 'nothing in
the record suggests that the award ... is punitive.'"
(Quoting Weber). Weber explained that a state rate is
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nonpunitive so long as it is a rate of general applicability and is not limited to cases in which a defendant
acted in bad faith. 541 F.3d at 1017; see Biava v.
Insurers Administrative Corp., 1995 WL 94461 (lOth
Cir. March 1, 1995) ("State law governs prejudgment
interest."). The Tenth Circuit imposes prejudgment
interest on the proportion of an award that will be
used to pay taxes, clearly not a make-whole remedy
because it was the Internal Revenue Service, not the
plaintiff, that would have benefitted from an earlier
payment. See Dalal v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 72
F. 3d 137, 1995 WL 74 7442 at *6 (lOth Cir. 1995)
("prejudgment interest should be awarded on the
entire back pay award in employment discrimination
cases because it is better to confer a windfall upon a
claimant than the defendant in order to discourage
future discrimination."). District courts in the Tenth
Circuit regularly apply state-law prejudgment interest rates in ERISA cases; we set out a list of such
cases in the Appendix. App. 134a-35a.
The Eleventh Circuit also suggests that district
courts "look to state interest rates to fill a gap in
ERISA law." Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance
Co. of New York, 50 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1995);
Florence Nightingale Nursing Service v. Blue Cross/
Blue Shield of Alabama, 41 F. 3d 1476, 1484 (11th Cir.
1995), approved the district court decision to use an
Alabama prejudgment interest statute, which provides an interest rate of over 18% a year, to "fill a gap
in ERISA law." The district courts in the Eleventh
Circuit understand the court of appeals to have
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"endorsed the practice of looking to analogous state
· law provisions" in setting prejudgment interest rates
in ERISA cases. Kinser v. Plans Administration
Committee of Citigroup, Inc., 2008 WL 762200 at
*1 (M.D. Ga. March 18, 2008); Lyons v. GeorgiaPacific Corp. Salaried Employees Retirement Plan,
196 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2002). District
courts in the Eleventh Circuit regularly apply statelaw prejudgment interest rates in ERISA cases; we
set out a list of such cases in the Appendix. App. 136a.
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, expressly
rejects this mechanical adoption of state law rates.
"Among the constraints on a district court's discretion
to shape an award of prejudgment interest in an
ERISA case is the fact that we look with disfavor on
simply adopting state law interest rates." Rybarczyk
v. TRW, Inc., 235 F. 3d 975, 985 (6th Cir. 2000). "Incorporation of state standards in the calculation of
prejudgment interest could frustrate ERISA's remedial scheme." Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d
613, 617 (6th Cir. 1998). "[T]he calculation of prejudgment interest is not an area 'primarily of state
concern' for which there does not exist a substantial
body of federal law." Id. District courts in the Sixth
Circuit understand Rybarczyk and Ford to bar utilization of state interest rates. 18 A state prejudgment
18 Masters v. Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan for
Automated Packaging Systems, Inc., 2009 WL 1183377 at *2
(N.D. Ohio May 1, 2009) (declining to apply Ohio prejudgment
interest rates of 5% to 8% in light of Rybarczyk); Kramer v. Paul
(Continued on following page)·

30
interest rate could be used in the Sixth Circuit only if
that rate happened to coincide with the particular
rate that a court concluded was needed to make the
beneficiary whole.

D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT UTILIZES THE
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE IN
§ 1961
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly admonished
district courts to calculate prejudgment interest using
the post-judgment rate in § 1961(a). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a). That rate is the weekly average yield on
one-year Treasury bills. The most recent rate was
0.27% for July 2015. 19
"[T]his circuit has a strong policy in favor of the
Treasury bill rate .... " Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d
1574, 1576 (9th Cir. 1987). "We have held that the
interest rate prescribed for post-judgment interest
Revere Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1218715 at *1-*2 (E.D. Mich. April
23, 2007) (declining to apply Michigan prejudgment interest rate
in light of Ford and Rybarczyk); Brooking v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 781333 at *2 (E.D. Ky. March 12,
2007) (declining to apply Kentucky prejudgment interest rate of
12% in light of Ford and Rybarczyk); Loucks v. Liberty Life
Assurance Co. of Boston, 2004 WL 3255332 at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 22, 2004) (declining to apply Michigan prejudgment interest rate under Mich. Comp. Law § 438.31 (5%) in light of
Ford; "[Ford] favored the application of the post-judgment rate
specified under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 rather than a state interest
rate").
19 http://www. utd. uscourts.gov/documents/judgpage.html.
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is appropriate for fixing the
rate of pre-judgment interest 'unless the trial judge
finds, on substantial evidence, that the equities of that
particular case required a different rate.'" Nelson v. E
G & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d
1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Western Pacific
Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280,
1289 (9th Cir. 1984)). "The district court may depart
from the Treasury bill rate, but only if substantial
evidence supports the decision to do so and only if the
departure is accompanied by a reasoned justification." Hayes v. Arthur Young & Co., 1994 WL 463493
at *17 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994); see Day v. AT&T
Disability Income, 2015 WL 1567857 (9th Cir. April 9,
2015); Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of
Boston, 486 F.3d 620, 628 (9th Cir. 2007); OroszSalomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F. 3d 1154,
1164 (9th Cir. 2001).
District courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly
apply § 1961(a) in ERISA cases; we set out a list of
such cases in the Appendix. App. 137a-40a.
Unlike the limitation established by the Sixth
Circuit in this case, the Ninth Circuit awards prejudgment interest even in cases in which doing so is
not necessary to make the plaintiff whole. Zumstein
v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 1992 WL 124424 at
*2 (9th Cir. June 9, 1992) (approving prejudgment
interest for failure to pay medical benefits despite the
fact that the beneficiary had not paid the bills in
question and was not being charged interest by the
medical provider.).
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E. THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT IS WELL RECOGNIZED
The multi-faceted conflict is widely recognized.
Courts have repeatedly noted the circuit conflict
regarding whether to use state rates rather than the
§ 1961 rate 20 and regarding whether to use the § 1961
Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 984-85 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("Continental would apply the rate set down in the
postjudgment interest statute to awards of prejudgment interest. This court, however, has already rejected that position.")
(citing United States ex rel. Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d
1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987)); Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc., 1997 WL
580609 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 1997).
("[T]here is considerable support for using the§ 1961 rate to
calculate prejudgment interest.... [T]he Ninth Circuit has held
that the § 1961 rate should be applied unless the trial court
finds that the equities of a particular case justify use of a different rate .... On the other hand, many courts have held that a
federal court may look to state law for guidance in determining
the rate of prejudgment interest."); DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot
Financial Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1198173 at *2 (D. Colo. May 1,
2009) (contrasting Tenth Circuit rule relying on state law with
practice in "other circuit courts" applying § 1961); DeGrado v.
Jefferson Pilot Financial Ins. Co., 367 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1328 (D.
Colo. 2005) (contrasting Tenth Circuit standard and that in
"many circuits" applying state law with use of§ 1961 in "several
courts"); Edmonds v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 1998 WL 782016 at *2
(E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 1998) ("several circuits have approved the use
of the post-judgment interest rate in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) to
compute pre-judgment interest on ERISA damage awards ....
Nonetheless, several decisions have used state law interest rates
in setting the rate of pre-judgment interest on ERISA damages
awards."); Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance Co. of New
York, 50 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize that some
circuit courts have approved the use of the section 1961(a) postjudgment rate to compute pre-judgment interest.... Because
(Continued on following page)
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rate rather than make an individualized determination of the appropriate rate. 21
The dissenting opinion in the court below, citing
a number of the cases described above, correctly
noted that the standard adopted by the en bane
majority conflicted with the standard applied in the
Second, Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, all of
which permit or require the use of a rate based in
whole or in part on the need to prevent unjust enrichment. App. 63a-68a. The dissenters, citing many
of the same decisions from those circuits described
above, noted that "a litany of [cases] from four of our
sister circuits undermine the majority's premise that
no legal basis exists to conclude that ... a breach of
LINA's fiduciary duties [is] remediable under
§ 1132(a)(3)." App. 69a. 22 "[T]he relief for the wrongful
district courts have discretion in determining pre-judgment
interest rates, we hold that district courts are not required to
use section 1961(a) in computing such interest.").
21 Hizer v. General Motors Corp., Allison Gas Turbine Diu.,
888 F.Supp. 1453, 1463 (S.D. Ind. 1995), noted that the Fifth
Circuit in Hansen and the Tenth Circuit in Biava had borrowed
the state statutory rate. "But the Seventh Circuit has followed a
different course .... [T]he Seventh Circuit has ... held that the appropriate rate is the market rate .... A simple (and acceptable)
approximation of the market rate is the prime rate .... " Roden v.
Amerisourcebergen, 186 Cal.App. 4th 620, 656-57 (4th App.Dist.
2010), "recognized that not all circuits agree with the Ninth Circuit in terms of the particular rate of interest to be applied ....
The First and Fourth Circuits ... leave it to the full discretion of
the trial court to set the interest rate."
22 The dissenting opinion cited, inter alia, the Second Circuit decision in Dunnigan, and Third Circuit decision in Fotta,
(Continued on following page)
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gain falls squarely within ERISA's equitable remedies,
as recognized by the Supreme Court, .. . and other
circuits." "[By] affirm[ing] the district court's decision
to require LINA to disgorge the profit it earned by
breaching its fiduciary duties to Rochow, ... we
[would] simply join the mainstream view of our sister
circuits acknowledging the trust law principles that
undergird ERISA's equity jurisprudence." App. 71a.

II.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE

The question presented in this case affects a far
larger number of ERISA cases than any of the ERISA
issues on which this Court has granted review in the
past. In virtually every case in which a beneficiary
establishes that a plan wrongfully denied, or delayed,
benefits, the court will be called upon to determine
whether to award prejudgment interest or some other
delay-related remedy, and to determine the appropriate rate. This issue was litigated in the district
court decision in Amara. 23 The question also has
been litigated in cases in which the Department of
Labor seeks benefits on behalf of a beneficiary. 24

the Seventh Circuit decisions in Clair and May, and the Eighth

Circuit decision in Parke. App. 63a-68a.
23 Amara v. Cigna Corp., 559 F.Supp.2d 192, 220-21 (D.
Conn. 2008).
24 E.g., Perez v. Bruister, 54 F.Supp.3d 629, 680 (S.D. Miss.
2014).
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Benefit disputes constitute the largest portion of the
more than 7,000 ERISA cases filed each year in
federal court.
This Court has repeatedly granted certiorari to
resolve issues regarding prejudgment interest. 25 The
practical importance of the issue in this case is particularly great.
The consequences of the en bane decision in this
case are not limited to litigated cases; by stripping
courts in the Sixth Circuit of the power to require
ERISA violators to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, the
decision below seriously weakens the incentive to
comply with ERISA itself. "Allowing LINA to retain
its profit creates an incentive for claims administrators to delay paying much-needed benefits to participants and beneficiaries while investing that money
for their own gain .... LINA gains from delaying the
claims process as long as possible. Permitting LINA
to keep its profit also encourages fiduciaries to commingle plan assets with company funds." App. 72a.
That consequence is particularly serious with
regard to the insurance companies that generally
provide ERISA-regulated health, life and disability
E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189 (1995); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990); Loeffler v. Frank, 486
U.S. 549 (1988); Monessen Southwestern Rwy. Co. v. Morgan,
486 U.S. 330 (1988); General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461
u.s. 648 (1983).
25
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insurance. As this case illustrates, the total amount
of insurance that these companies can write, and
thus their profits, are generally proportional to the
assets (or "surplus") of the company itself. Each
dollar of wrongfully unpaid benefits may permit the
insurance company to write (and profit from) more
insurance. This "surplus" functions like capitalization;
the amount of additional insurance a company can
write is typically a significant multiple of the amount
of its surplus. Insurance firms cannot, however, treat
borrowed money as part of their surplus.
Congress enacted ERISA because it well understood that plans and fiduciaries are often in a position
to profit from the types of wrongdoing forbidden by
the statute. Violations of ERISA can be quite profitable, whether on a plan-wide scale or- as here- in
individual cases. The decision of the Sixth Circuit,
guaranteeing that wrongdoers will be able to pocket
those ill-gotten gains in the right circumstances, is an
intolerable invitation for plans and fiduciaries to engage in dubious or even palpably unlawful practices.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit is clearly wrong.
The essential premise of the decision below, that
ERISA remedies are limited to providing compensation, is inconsistent with the decisions of this Court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
"appropriate equitable relief" authorized by
§ 502(a)(3) encompasses those categories of relief that
"were typically available in equity." Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361
(2006); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248,
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256 (1993). CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866
(2011), made clear that "[e]quity courts possessed the
power to provide relief in the form of monetary 'compensation' for a loss resulting from a trustee's breach
of duty, or to prevent the trustee's unjust enrichment."
131 S.Ct. at 1880 (emphasis added). This Court
should grant review to restore the equitable power of
federal courts to prevent such unjust enrichment.
This case is an excellent vehicle for resolving the
question presented. The Sixth Circuit decided this
case on a single ground, that under ERISA the remedy for the wrongful delay in paying a benefit is
limited to the amount needed to make whole the
beneficiary, and cannot be framed to prevent unjust
enrichment. The court of appeals decision did not
turn on the particular facts of this case, and did not
address the particular rates and amounts involved. If
this Court holds that such remedies are limited to
making whole the beneficiary, the case would then be
an ideal vehicle for determining whether the rate to
be used should be based on state law, on§ 1961(a), or
on the particular circumstances of each case.

--------·--------
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in
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and DONALD, JJ., joined, and WHITE, J., joined in
part.

OPINION
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.
This is the second time this case has been before
the Sixth Circuit. The first time, we affirmed the
district court's determination that defendant Life
Insurance Company of North America ("LINA") acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Daniel

Rochow's claim for long-term disability benefits under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). Rochow v. LINA, 482
F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007) ("Rochow I"). Our second
review comes after the district court ordered that
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LINA disgorge profits flowing from its wrongful
denial of benefits. A divided three-judge panel affirmed the district court's order. Rockow v. LINA, 737
F.3d 415 (6th Cir.2013) ("Rockow II"). We granted
rehearing en bane, thereby vacating Rockow II, in
order to reconsider as a full court whether the disgorgement award was proper. For the reasons that
follow, we vacate the disgorgement award and remand the case to the district court to determine
whether prejudgment interest is appropriate.
I

The facts of this case are adequately summarized
in Rockow II and are reproduced here:
In mid-2000, the late Daniel J. Rochow
("Rochow"), a principal of Universico Insurance Company ("Universico"), sold his interest in Universico to Arthur J. Gallagher &
Co. ("Gallagher") and became President of
Gallagher. As an employee of Gallagher,
Rochow was covered under Life Insurance
Company of North America ("LINA") policy
number LK 30214. LINA's policy provided for
disability benefits if an employee gave "satisfactory proof" that "solely because of Injury
or Sickness [the employee is] unable to perform all material duties of [his or her] Regular Occupation or a Qualified Alternative[.]"
See Rockow v. LINA ("Rockow I"), 482 F.3d
860, 863-64 (6th Cir.2007).
In 2001, Rochow began to experience short
term memory loss, occasional chills, sporadic
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sweating, and stress at work. Id. In July
2001, Gallagher demoted Rochow from President to Sales Executive-Account Manager
because Rochow could no longer perform
his duties as President. Id. Rochow continued to have difficulties, and as a result of
his inability to perform his job, Gallagher
forced Rochow to resign effective January 2,
2002. Id. In February 2002, Rochow experienced periods of amnesia and was hospitalized. Id. During his February 2002 hospital
stay, Rochow was diagnosed with HSVEncephalitis, a rare and severely debilitating
brain infection. Id.
On or about December 31, 2002, Rochow filed
a claim for long term disability benefits.
LINA denied Rochow benefits stating that
Rochow's employment ended before his disability began. Rochow I, 482 F.3d at 864.
Rochow appealed LINA's denial and included
medical records from 2001 that stated
Rochow was suffering short-term memory
loss during 2001. In denying Rochow's appeal, LINA noted that Rochow experienced
the effects of encephalitis during 2001 but
denied coverage because Rochow continued
to work and was not disabled until February
2002. Rockow I, 482 F.3d at 864.
Rochow again appealed and included a report from Jack Tellerico, an area vice president for Gallagher, which identified the
material duties of Rochow's position with
Gallagher and stated that during 2001,
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Rochow was not able to perform all the material duties of those jobs due to his lack of
memory. LINA again denied Rochow's claims
stating, "[s]ince, Mr. Rochow's long-term disability claim was not filed until after his
termination date; his claim was denied because of, 'not considered actively working at
time of disability.' It appears no additional
documentation was provided which would
support that Mr. Rochow was actively working when he became disabled.'" (Page ID
4056) (Joint App'x) (sic).
Rochow appealed the denial a third time.
LINA denied his claim for the final time stating Rochow had not presented any medical
records to support his inability to work prior
to the date he was terminated.
On September 17, 2004, Rochow filed a complaint against Cigna Group Insurance,
LINA's parent company, in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. Compl., ECF No. 1. The complaint
states two claims under ERISA § 502(a)(3),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3): one to recover full
benefits due to the failure to pay benefits in
violation of the terms of the plan and one to
remedy the alleged breach of fiduciary duty
in ERISA Section 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
Defendant moved for judgment on the record
and Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
On June 24, 2005, Judge Tarnow of the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan heard oral arguments on
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the parties' motions. At the conclusion of oral
argument, Judge Tarnow stated on the record that LINA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding Rochow was not disabled
while still employed and that Rochow had
prevailed. In a one page order which incorporated the reasoning stated on the record, the
Court granted Rochow's motion and denied
LINA's motion. The same day, the district
court clerk filed a judgment which purported
to dismiss the case and was signed by the
district court clerk and Judge Tarnow.
LINA appealed the June 24, 2005 Order
denying Defendant's motion and granting
Plaintiff's motion. Rochow moved to enforce
judgment or require Defendant to post a supersedeas bond pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62(d). Eventually this motion
was withdrawn and Defendant deposited a
supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000.
On April 3, 2007, a panel of this Court affirmed Judge Tarnow's Order. Rochow I, 482
F.3d at 866. The Rochow I panel held the
record supported the district court's decision
that LINA's denial of Rochow's claims was
arbitrary and capricious, was not the result
of a deliberate, principled reasoning process,
and did not appear to have been made "'solely
in the interest ofthe participants and beneficiaries and [] for the exclusive purpose of []
providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries' as required by ERISA. 29
U.S.C. § 1104(A)(l)." 1d. The opinion noted,
"there is no 'logical incompatibility between
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working full time and being disabled from
working full time'" and that the policy required only "satisfactory proof of disability,
not medical evidence." Id. (internal citations
omitted). On the same day, the clerk for this
Court entered judgment stating "the order of
the district court is AFFIRMED." The clerk
of this Court issue4 the mandate on April 26,
2007, and it was filed May 3, 2007.
On May 10, 2007, the parties filed a stipulation "to toll the time for all parties and counsel to bring any post remand motions," and
the district court entered an Order tolling
the filing deadlines for post-remand motions
until further order of the court. On April 3,
2008, the district court referred the remaining issues in dispute to United States Magistrate Judge Whalen. Over the next few
months, Judge Whalen held several status
conferences.
On November 10, 2008, LINA filed a statement of resolved and unresolved issues and
Plaintiff1 filed motions for attorneys' fees and
costs and equitable accounting. LINA's statement of issues represented that the parties still disputed several issues, including
1 Rochow died on October 16, 2008, and the representative
of his estate, Patrick Rochow, was substituted as plaintiff in this
action. Later, Todd R. Rochow and John D. Rochow were substituted as administrators of Daniel Rochow's estate and as plaintiffs in this case. For consistency, this opinion refers to all litigation actions taken on behalf of Rochow's estate as actions by
[Rochow].
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whether Plaintiff was entitled to a disgorgement of profits.
Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking an
equitable accounting and a request for disgorgement. In that motion, Plaintiff argued
Rochow's estate was entitled to disgorgement
of profits because LINA breached its fiduciary duties, and disgorgement was necessary
to prevent LIN.A:s unjust enrichment resulting
from profits it earned on the wrongfully retained benefits. Plaintiff supported the motion
with the report of his expert, Dr. David C.
Crosen [sic]. In calculating LIN.A:s "Return
on (Average) Equity" ("ROE"), Dr. Crosen [sic]
determined LINA used Rochow's benefits to
earn between 11 percent and 39 percent annually and, therefore, made approximately
$2.8 million by retaining Rochow's benefits.
In June 2009, the district court granted
Plaintiff's motion for an equitable accounting of profits and disgorgement of
the same. LINA then moved to strike
Croson's report and to preclude him from
testifying as an expert on the ground
that his principles and methods were
unreliable under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 702 and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 589 [113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d
469] (1993). The motion was referred to
the magistrate judge, who issued a report recommending that the motion be
denied, noting that the matter was being
tried to the court rather than a jury and
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finding that many of LINA's objections
went to the weight of Croson's opinions,
not their admissibility. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation over LINA's objections.
After the parties briefed the issue, the
district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing in November 2011 on the issue
of calculation of profits for disgorgement.
At the hearing, LINA offered the testimony of its expert, Timothy Holzli, who
served as the Chief Accounting Officer
for the group insurance division of
Cigna. Holzli opined Rochow's withheld
benefits earned LINA profits of $32,732.
He arrived at that figure by treating the
withheld benefits as though they were
earning interest as part of LINA's investment assets. On cross examination,
Holzli acknowledged, however, that the
account was not a separate or segregated account. He also conceded that LINA
payed [sic] its operating expenses and
benefits from the account, and the money
in the account formed a basis for LINA
to write insurance coverage.
Following additional briefing and oral argument, the district court issued its decision
on calculation of profits for disgorgement in
March 2012. 2 The district court adopted
The district court's decision is reported at Rochow v.
LINA, 851 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Mich.2012).
2
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Croson's ROE metric as the basis for determining the profits LINA gained from the
wrongfully withheld funds, and it rejected
Holzli's retained investment margin metric.
It did so, in part, based upon its factual finding that the subject money was not placed in
a separate investment account, but rather
was available for LINA to use for any business purpose. In the last paragraph of its decision, the district court stated:
Plaintiff will, within two weeks from this order, submit a final amount to be disgorged by
Defendant based upon the Court's rulings,
above. Defendant may then submit a memorandum in response within seven days. This
memorandum is limited only to any objections regarding the accuracy of Plaintiff's
calculations based on this order, and is not
an invitation to relitigate issues already decided by this Court.
(Page ID 3576).
On May 4, 2012, in its response brief to
Plaintiff's final calculation of disgorgement, LINA argued for the first time
that permitting disgorgement was outside the scope of the mandate in the first
appeal. Nonetheless, on July 24, 2012,
the district court ordered disgorgement
of $3,797,867.92. The court noted, "Defendant has, in response to a proposed
order submitted by Plaintiff, raised objections. To the extent that these objections do not simply repeat arguments

11a
already rejected by the Court, and raise
new issues in Defendant's argument
concerning the 'mandate rule,' they are
untimely and will not be considered."
(Page ID 3907). LINA timely appealed.

Rochow II, 737 F.3d at 417-20 (alteration in original).
On December 6, 2013, a panel of this court affirmed the disgorgement award, holding that disgorgement was properly ordered under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) for LINA's breach of fiduciary duty and
that Rochow's claim for such relief was not an impermissible repackaging of a claim for wrongful
denial of benefits under§ 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 423. The
Rochow II panel stated that the successful result
obtained by Rochow on his claim for wrongful denial
of benefits in Rochow I did not preclude additional
relief on Rochow's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Id.
at 422-23. LINA's petition for en bane rehearing was
granted on February 19, 2014, vacating the panel's
decision in Rochow II.
II

There is essentially one issue before us: Is Rochow
entitled to recover under both ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
and § 502(a)(3) for LINA's arbitrary and capricious denial of long-term disability benefits? As a result of our
ruling in Rochow I, Rochow recovered all benefits that
he had been wrongfully denied under § 502(a)(l)(B).
We now decide whether Rochow may also recover under § 502(a)(3), which makes "appropriate equitable

12a
relief" available to redress such violations as a breach
of fiduciary duty. 3 The district court held that Rochow
3 We assume, for present purposes, that the district court
made a finding that LINA breached a fiduciary duty owed to
Rochow. However, the district court's various orders are devoid
of any such express finding. When the case was before the district court on the issue of whether the plan administrator arbitrarily and capriciously denied benefits, the court ruled from
the bench in granting summary judgment for Rochow. The transcript of the hearing reveals no express finding of a breach of
fiduciary duty. R. 19, Hearing Tr. at 24, Page ID 4095. Further,
the one-page order that memorialized the district court's ruling
includes the finding simply that "the denial of Plaintiff's claim
was arbitrary and capricious." R. 16, Order at 1, Page ID 105.
There is no mention of a breach of fiduciary duty. The judgment
order that issued the same day, apart from granting Rochow's
claim for benefits wrongfully denied, "dismissed" the case. That
is, the district court appeared to have dismissed the breach-offiduciary-duty claim as a claim pled in the alternative and
rendered moot by Rochow's success on the principal claim. R. 17,
Judgment, Page ID 106.
In Rockow I, similarly, we did not address any claim
for breach of fiduciary duty, or even use the terms "fiduciary," "duty," or ''breach" in the opinion. Admittedly,
one could infer from Rockow I that LINA's fiduciary
duty was alluded to in the observation that LINA's decision did not appear to have been made "'solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and [] for the exclusive purpose of [] providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries' as required
by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)." See Rockow I, 482
F.3d at 866. However, no ruling on a breach-offiduciary-duty claim was before the court and the
opinion contains no analysis of the point.
After the district court's initial decision was affirmed
and the district court took up the motion for equitable
accounting, however, the court rejected LINA's argument that it had not made the requisite finding of a
(Continued on following page)
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could recover under both provisions because Rochow
pleaded claims for two distinct kinds of relief, namely
one claim to recover benefits arbitrarily and capriciously
breach of fiduciary duty to trigger the availability of
equitable relief. Citing Varity, the court stated, "an
arbitrary or capricious denial of benefits can count as
a breach of fiduciary duty." R. 67, Order at 4, Page ID
935. Further, when the district court set the method of
accounting for the disgorgement award, it stated "it
has already been determined that Defendant owed
Plaintiff a duty of loyalty and breached this duty
through its arbitrary and capricious denial of disability benefits to Plaintiff." R. 113, Order at 2, Page ID
3562. The district court thus treated its fmding of an
arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, in and of
itself, as a breach of fiduciary duty. The district court
never identified any other grounds for finding a
breach of a fiduciary duty. In the district court's ruling, it was one and the same injury that made out
two distinct ERISA violations and justified both remedies.
Though we are aware of no persuasive authority for
the proposition that a wrongful denial of benefits in
and of itself constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty remediable under both § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(3), we
assume, without deciding, that the district court permissibly found a breach of fiduciary duty based on the
administrator's arbitrary and capricious denial ofbenefits. The dissenting opinion suggests other ways in
which LINA might be deemed to have breached a fiduciary duty, but the district court's judgment now
under review clearly includes no such ruling. Careful
review of the district court rulings cited in the dissent
discloses that the asserted fmdings of other instances
of misconduct by LINA were not identified by the district court as grounds for holding that LINA breached
its fiduciary duty.
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denied by LINA, and one claim for disgorgement of
profits realized by LINA as a result of its breach of
fiduciary duty consisting of the arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits. Contrary to Rochow's arguments, Rochow is made whole under § 502(a)(l)(B)
through recovery of his disability benefits and attorney's fees, and potential recovery of prejudgment
interest, discussed below. Allowing Rochow to recover
disgorged profits under § 502(a)(3), in addition to his
recovery under§ 502(a)(l)(B), based on the claim that
the wrongful denial of benefits also constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty, would - absent a showing
that the § 502(a)(l)(B) remedy is inadequate- result
in an impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to
clear Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.
ERISA has six remedial provisions. The remedial
provisions relevant to this action are § 502(a)(l)(B)
and § 502(a)(3), which state:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought (1) hy a participant or beneficiary-

(B) to recover benefits due him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights under the terms of the
plan;
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(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
Unfortunately for Rochow, Supreme Court precedent construing the interplay of these provisions
dictates a result contrary to that reached by the
district court. In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996), the Supreme
Court allowed a group of plaintiffs, who were unable
to bring a claim under§ 502(a)(1)(B), to bring suit for
breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3). As the
Court explained, § 502(a)(3) "functions as a safety
net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries
caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere
adequately remedy." Id. at 513, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Importantly, however, the Varity Court limited this
expansion of ERISA coverage by noting that "where
Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a
beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for
further equitable relief, in which case such relief
normally would not be appropriate." Id. at 515, 116
S.Ct. 1065 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Varity Court thus emphasized that ERISA
remedies are concerned with the adequacy of relief to
redress the claimant's injury, not the nature of the
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defendant's wrongdoing. The district court's use of
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) as the vehicle for its
disgorgement award misses the mark. Instead of
focusing on the relief available to make Rochow
whole, the award reflects concern that LINA had
wrongfully gained something, a consideration beyond
the ken of ERISA make-whole remedies. Varity indicates that equitable relief is not ordinarily appropriate where Congress has elsewhere provided adequate
means of redress for a claimant's injury. In other words,
a claimant cannot pursue a breach-of-fiduciary-duty
claim under § 502(a)(3) based solely on an arbitrary and
capricious denial of benefits where the § 502(a)(l)(B)
remedy is adequate to make the claimant whole.
Here, there is no showing that the benefits recovered
by Rochow, plus the attorney's fees awarded, plus the
prejudgment interest that may be awarded on remand, are inadequate to make Rochow whole. Absent
such a showing, there is no trigger for "further equitable relief" under Varity.
If an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits
implicated a breach of fiduciary duty entitling the
claimant to disgorgement of the defendant's profits in
addition to recovery of benefits, then equitable relief
would be potentially available whenever a benefits
denial .is held to be arbitrary or capricious. This
would be plainly beyond and inconsistent with
ERIS.Ns purpose to make claimants whole. Tellingly,
the appellate briefing contains citation to no case that
allowed disgorgement of profits under § 502(a)(3)
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after the claimant recovered for wrongful denial of
benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Here in the Sixth Circuit we have had occasion to
apply Varity's teaching on the relationship between
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3) in Wilkins v. Baptist
Healthcare System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.1998).
In Wilkins, Wilkins applied for long-term disability
benefits and, after the plan administrator denied his
claim, sued for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) and for
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) based on breach of
fiduciary duty. We denied relief under § 502(a)(3)
stating:
Because [§ 502(a)(1)(B)] provides a remedy
for Wilkins's alleged injury that allows him
to bring a lawsuit to challenge the Plan Administrator's denial of benefits to which he
believes he is entitled, he does not have a
right to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to [§ 502(a)(3)].

Id. at 615. Just like the plaintiff in Wilkins, Rochow is
not entitled to relief under the catchall provision:
such relief is unnecessary and unavailable because he
has an adequate remedy under § 502(a)(1)(B).
LINA thus contends the district court's disgorgement award contravenes Wilkins and allows a claimant to improperly repackage a claim for benefits
wrongfully denied as a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty. Rochow insists that Wilkins provided a
way to ensure only that claimants do not attempt an
"end run" around ERISA's limitations by repackaging
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an unsuccessful claim for benefits as a claim for
"appropriate relief" based on an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty. Rochow claims that Wilkins bars relief
sought under § 502(a)(3) only if that same type of
relief could have been obtained under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Because he purportedly seeks a type of relief under
§ 502(a)(3) (i.e., disgorgement of LIN.Ns profits) different from and in addition to what is available to
him under § 502(a)(1)(B), Rochow contends that
Wilkins does not preclude his claim for this additional
remedy to obtain complete relief.
Rochow mischaracterizes Wilkins. A claimant
can pursue a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under
§ 502(a)(3), irrespective of the degree of success
obtained on a claim for recovery of benefits under
§ 502(a)(1)(B), only where the breach of fiduciary duty
claim is based on an injury separate and distinct from
the denial of benefits or where the remedy afforded
by Congress under § 502(a)(1)(B) is otherwise shown
to be inadequate. See Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp.
Long Term Disability Plan, 4 77 F.3d 833, 840-42 (6th
Cir.2007). Wilkins simply affords no support for the
argument that § 502(a)(3) equitable relief may be
appropriate to further redress a wrongful denial of
benefits adequately remediable under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Rather, Wilkins makes clear that the availability of
relief under § 502(a)(3) is contingent on a showing
that the claimant could not avail himself or herself
of an adequate remedy pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B).
Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 615.
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Rochow contends there is no legitimate concern
about impermissible claim "repackaging'' when a
benefits-claimant prevails and seeks "other appropriate equitable relief." We disagree. Impermissible
repackaging is implicated whenever, in addition to
the particular adequate remedy provided by Congress, a duplicative or redundant remedy is pursued
to redress the same injury. Because Rochow was able
to avail himself of an adequate remedy for LIN.Ns
wrongful denial of benefits pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B),
he cannot obtain additional relief for that same injury
under § 502(a)(3).
In Hill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710 (6th Cir.2005), we further clarified
the interplay of§. 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3). In Hill,
the plaintiffs brought a class-action lawsuit seeking
individual relief for wrongfully denied benefits under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and for plan-wide injunctive relief
under § 502(a)(3) based upon the defendant's alleged
breach of its fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the § 502(a)(3) claim, finding that "these
claims were merely repackaged claims for individual
benefits and did not constitute actual fiduciary-duty
claims." Id. at 717. We reversed. Whereas Wilkins
involved the rejection of fiduciary-duty claims on the
basis that they were actually disguised individualbenefits claims, in Hill the need for relief under the
catchall provision arose out of a defect in planwide claim handling procedures, implicating a different injury. "The award of benefits to a particular
[plaintiff] based on an improperly denied claim for
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emergency-medical-treatment expenses will not change
the fact that [defendant] is using an allegedly improper methodology for handling ... claims." Id. at
718. To remedy this separate and distinct injury, we
permitted injunctive relief under § 502(a)(3), not an
additional award of monetary damages for the same
denial of benefits. Thus, Hill recognized an exception
to Varity and Wilkins where "[o]nly injunctive relief of
the type available under [§ 502(a)(3) would] provide
the complete relief sought by Plaintiffs by requiring
[Defendant] to alter the manner in which it administers all the Program's claims ...." Id. at 718 (emphasis added). In Hill, as in Varity, the primary purpose
of ERISA was given effect - ensuring availability of
an adequate remedy to make the plaintiffs whole.
The present case does not fall within the Hill
exception to Varity and Wilkins. Hill distinguished
between the denial of individual claims and plan-wide
mishandling of claims as two distinct injuries. Section
502(a)(1)(B) provided relief for the denial of the Hill
plaintiffs' individual benefits, and § 502(a)(3) remedied the systemic plan-wide problems that posed a
potential for future injury. Contrast Hill with the
present case, where the only asserted injury to
Rochow is the denial of benefits and withholding of
the same benefits. These are not distinct injuries;
they are one and the same injury. Because Rochow
has an adequate and effective remedy for this injury
under § 502(a)(1)(B), he is not also entitled to relief
under § 502(a)(3).
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Rochow continues to claim that the disgorgement
award ("equitable accounting") remedies an injury
entirely distinct from the injury remedied by recovery
of his benefits, and that he has therefore suffered two
distinct injuries. Rochow contends that he suffered
his first injury when LINA improperly denied his
benefits, and he suffered his second "injury'' when
LINA used the funds it owed him to generate $3.7
million in profits for its own account without remitting the profits to him. Yet, in an action for wrongful
denial of benefits, like this one, the denial of benefits
necessarily results in a continued withholding of
benefits until the denial is either finalized or rectified. The denial is the injury and the withholding is
simply ancillary thereto, the continuing effect of the
same denial. Together they comprise a single injury.
By withholding payment of benefits until the denial
was either finalized or rectified, LINA did not violate
a second, distinct duty owed to Rochow and did not
inflict a second injury.
Nor can it be said that Rochow suffered a second
injury, or that his injury was exacerbated, as a result of any gain realized by LINA before it paid the
wrongfully withheld benefits. Rochow's loss remained
exactly the same irrespective of the use made by
LINA of the withheld benefits. Despite Rochow's
creative use of semantics, the reality remains clear:
Rochow suffered one injury, the denial of his benefits.
And neither Rochow nor the dissent has succeeded in
identifying any way in which the remedy available
under § 502(a)(l)(B) - i.e., recovery of benefits and
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attorney's fees and, potentially, prejudgment interest
- is inadequate to make Rochow whole. The remedy
Congress chose to make available under § 502(a)(1)(B)
having thus not been shown to be inadequate, it
follows that permitting Rochow to obtain further
equitable relief for the same injury under § 502(a)(3)
would contravene the scheme established by Congress as well as the Supreme Court's teaching in
Varity.
Rochow cites two cases to support his claim that
he is entitled to equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). He
contends that Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
725 F.3d 406 (3d Cir.2013), stands for the proposition
that disgorgement of profits may be an appropriate
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty even in the absence of a showing of financial loss by the claimant.
The discussion in Edmonson on which Rochow relies
is addressed solely to the question whether an ERISA
claimant had standing to bring a claim for disgorgement of profits notwithstanding a lack of showing of
financial loss. The court answered this question in
the affirmative, based on trust law principles. Id. at
415-17. However, the court ultimately denied relief
for lack of a showing of a breach of fiduciary duty and
lack of a showing that any such breach proximately
caused injury to the claimant. Id. at 423-26. There
was no claim in Edmonson for benefits wrongfully
denied, but only a stand-alone claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Hence, the Edmonson court did not have
occasion to address the interplay of§ 502(a)(1)(B) and
§ 502(a)(3) or to consider whether the availability of
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other remedies under ERISA rendered equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) inappropriate. Edmonson's observations about standing, viewed in context, are of
limited significance to the issue before us.
Rochow also relies on CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, _
U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1881, 179 L.Ed.2d 843
(2011), to support his argument that the failure to
show a second, distinct injury is not fatal to his
disgorgement award under § 502(a)(3). In Amara, he
contends, the Court recognized that in an action for
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), the requisite "actual harm" may consist simply of "the loss of a right
protected by ERISA or its trust-law antecedents." Id.
at 1881. Again, the argument misses the point. There
is no dispute that "appropriate equitable relief" may
be obtained under § 502(a)(3) to redress an ERISA
violation by a plan fiduciary. The point, as detailed
above, is that Rochow did not suffer an injury remediable under § 502(a)(3) in this case. Rochow suffered the wrongful denial of his benefits, an injury
adequately remedied under § 502(a)(1)(B). Despite
Rochow's insistence to the contrary, his breach-offiduciary-duty claim for disgorgement of profits is
nothing but a repackaged claim for benefits wrongfully denied, a claim for which, per Varity, additional
equitable relief is not appropriate because not necessary to make Rochow whole. Rochow's reliance on
Amara is to no avail.
Rochow insists that Varity and Amara, read
together, indicate that a plaintiff may obtain relief
under both § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(3) if "other
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appropriate equitable relief" is necessary to make the
plaintiff whole for injury caused by the wrongful
denial of benefits. He argues that Varity made clear
that "other appropriate equitable relief" may be
available under § 502(a)(3) when a party cannot
obtain relief under § 502(a)(l)(B). Further, Amara
identified a range of equitable remedies potentially
available under § 502(a)(3), including surcharge. 4
Reading Varity and Amara together thus supports the
notion, Rochow contends, that disgorgement of profits
is available in the instant case because recovery of
benefits under§ 502(a)(l)(B) did not make him whole
for the injury caused by LINA's breach of fiduciary
duty.
Rochow's reading misses a logical step: "other
appropriate equitable relief" is not necessary to make
him whole. While Varity certainly acknowledges the
possibility of equitable relief, and Amara outlines the
4 The statements made by the Supreme Court in Amara
regarding the equitable remedies available to courts under
§ 502(a)(3) are merely dicta. The sole question before the Court
in Amara was whether the district court applied the correct
legal standard in determining whether CIGNA's failure to inform its employees of changes to the benefits plan caused its
employees sufficient injury to warrant legal relief. Amara, 131
S.Ct. at 1871. The Court also discussed whether § 502(a)(1)(B)
authorized the relief the district court awarded. In finding that
§ 502(a)(1)(B) was not the appropriate remedy, the Court went
on to acknowledge that § 502(a)(3) authorizes forms of relief
similar to§ 502(a)(l)(B). However, the Court did not decide what
remedies were available, and did not conclusively decide which
remedy was appropriate in the case before it. Id. at 1880.
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scope of potential equitable relief, when appropriate,
the Supreme Court has never stated that recovery
under both § 502(a)(3) and § 502(a)(l)(B) may be warranted for a single injury. Rochow claims two injuries
- the arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, and
the breach of fiduciary duty consisting of the continued withholding of the wrongfully denied benefits.
These "injuries," however, as explained above, are
indistinguishable. The Court in Varity made clear
that equitable relief is not ordinarily appropriate
where Congress has provided adequate relief for a
claimant's injury. The purpose behind ERISA continues to be remedial, and Rochow's injury was remedied
when he was awarded the wrongfully denied benefits
and attorney's fees - as potentially supplemented by
award of prejudgment interest, still to be determined.
Despite Rochow's attempts to obtain equitable relief
by repackaging the wrongful denial of benefits claim
as a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, there is but one
remediable injury and it is properly and adequately
remedied under § 502(a)(l)(B). Rochow and our dissenting colleagues wholly fail to explain how his
§ 502(a)(l)(B) remedies are inadequate to remedy his
lnJUry.

Rochow's final argument is that even if the
disgorgement relief is not available under § 502(a)(3),
he is entitled to prejudgment interest under
§ 502(a)(l)(B), a matter the district court failed to
address. We acknowledge that prejudgment interest
may be awarded in an appropriate case under ERISA.
"Though ERISA does not address the propriety of
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awarding prejudgment interest, prejudgment interest
may be awarded in the discretion of the district court.
Awards of prejudgment interest are compensatory,
not punitive, and a finding of wrongdoing by the
defendant is not a prerequisite to such an award."
Tiemeyer v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 8 F. 3d 1094, 1103
(6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct.
1371, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1993) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also Wells v. U.S. Steel, 76 F.3d
731, 737 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that district court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment
interest when pension fund wrongfully withheld
benefits).
Prejudgment interest cannot be awarded, however, at a rate so high that the award amounts to
punitive damages:
Although prejudgment interest is typically
not punitive, an excessive prejudgment interest rate would overcompensate an ERISA
plaintiff, thereby transforming the award of
prejudgment interest from a compensatory
damage award to a punitive one in contravention of ERISA's remedial goal of simply
placing the plaintiff in the position he or she
would have occupied but for the defendant's
wrongdoing.

Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th
Cir.1998). An interest award should "simply compensate a beneficiary for the lost interest value of money
wrongfully withheld from him or her." Rybarczyk v.
TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 985 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting
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Ford, 154 F.3d at 618). An excessive prejudgment
interest rate would "contravene ERISA's remedial
goal of simply placing the plaintiff in the position he
or she would have occupied but for the defendant's
wrongdoing." Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Retirement Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 686
(6th Cir.2013). Conversely, an exceedingly low award
would fail to make the plaintiff whole. !d.
Rochow's request for prejudgment interest appears to be a remedy the district court could have
granted, though not at an excessive rate. In his initial
complaint, Rochow requested various forms of relief,
including an "[o]rder compelling Defendant to pay
Plaintiff forthwith the full amount of employee benefits due him and to continue such payments for a
period set forth in the Plan, including interest on all
unpaid benefits." R. 1, Compl. at 6, Page ID 6.
Rochow also requested "[r]easonable attorney fees
and costs" and "[s]uch other relief as may be just and
appropriate." Id. When the case was remanded to the
district court following Rochow I, the parties treated
prejudgment interest as a live issue, fully briefing the
issue in connection with the proceedings on equitable
remedies. Yet when disgorgement of profits was
ordered, the question of prejudgment interest was
given no further consideration. Rochow thus prayed
for such relief in his complaint and has preserved his
request throughout the proceedings. The issue having
been thus far been [sic] pretermitted through no fault
of the parties, we remand the case once more to the
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district court for fresh consideration of Rochow's
entitlement to prejudgment interest.

III
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the
district court's disgorgement award under § 502(a)(3)
and REMAND the case to the district court for
consideration of whether and, if so, to what extent,
award of prejudgment interest is warranted under
§ 502(a)(l)(B) to make Rochow whole.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, concurring.
If one accepts the rather charitable assumptions
made in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, its reasoning is entirely correct. For that reason I concur in it. I
write separately to note, however, that if one does not
make those assumptions, the district court's disgorgement order cannot stand for purely procedural
reasons.
Rochow's complaint stated two claims: He alleged
that LINA wrongfully denied him benefits under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B), and he alleged that in doing
so, LINA breached its fiduciary duties under 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a). The second claim was styled as one
arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In his prayer for
relief, in addition to seeking an order compelling
LINA to pay him the benefits he believed he was due,

29a
Rochow sought disgorgement of any profits that LINA
had obtained as a result of its conduct.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. LINA requested that the district court
affirm its denial of Rochow's claim for benefits.
Rochow asserted only that LINA erroneously denied
him benefits pursuant to § 1132(a)(l)(B). 1 He styled
his summary judgment motion as a motion for partial
summary judgment, did not argue his breach-offiduciary-duty claim under § 1104(a) and § 1132(a)(3),
and did not mention disgorgement. When the district
court issued an order memorializing its from-thebench grant of Rochow's motion, it granted summary
judgment in full and made no mention of Rochow's
second claim.
Were there any doubt that Rochow's § 1132(a)(3)
claim no longer remained in the suit, the district
court's judgment ordered the case "DISMISSED."
This was a final judgment, conferring upon the
Rochow I panel appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. There was no other basis for appellate
jurisdiction, as the district court did not issue an
injunction triggering. the application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a), nor did it certify the case for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rochow
Among the other relief he sought, Rochow requested "[a]
full and accurate accounting by Defendant of all computations
1

for Plaintiff's disability benefits in sufficient detail so that

Plaintiff may ascertain that his benefits are being paid in the
proper amount."
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raised no issue on appeal regarding the district
court's failure to address his breach of fiduciary duty
claim. The Rockow I panel affirmed the district
court's grant of Rochow's motion for summary judgment, thus ending the case. The district court had
ordered the case dismissed. A panel of this court had
affirmed. And the panel did not remand the case to
the district court.
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, however, the
district court agreed to accept "post-remand" motions.
But the case had never been remanded, and, of
course, the parties could not stipulate to the district
court's retention of jurisdiction. Still, the district
court permitted Rochow to resuscitate his abandoned
disgorgement claim, after Rochow moved for the court
"to supervise the equitable accounting granted with
summary judgment." This motion was highly problematic. For starters, the district court never granted
equitable accounting as part of its summary judgment order. And to the extent Rochow mentioned
"accounting" in his motion for summary judgment~ he
sought an accounting of the amount of benefits due so
that he could ensure "that his benefits [we]re being
paid in the proper amount," not equitable accounting
tantamount to disgorgement. LINA is not without
fault either. It spent years litigating the case without
bringing these procedural defects to the district
court's attention.
When the district court finally granted Rochow's
motion for equitable accounting and ordered LINA to
disgorge profits, it violated the mandate rule. The ·
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mandate rule is a multifaceted "rule" governing the
relationship between the courts of appeals and the
district courts. Its fundamental principle is straightforward: A district court may not contravene an
appellate court's mandate. United States v. Campbell,
168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1999). For instance, if
a case is remanded, the mandate rule "forecloses
relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by
the appellate court." United States v. O'Dell, 320 F.3d
674, 679 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). And "where an issue was ripe for review at
the time of an initial appeal but was nonetheless
foregone, the mandate rule generally prohibits the
district court from reopening the issue on remand
unless the mandate can reasonably be understood as
permitting it to do so." I d.
Here, the Rockow I panel did not remand the
case to the district court, so any "post-remand" litigation was contrary to this court's mandate. See
United States v. Hamilton, 440 F.3d 693, 697-98 (5th
Cir.2006); Green v. Nevers, 196 F.3d 627, 632 (6th
Cir.1999). Even if Rockow I could be read as remanding the case to the district court for the issuance of a
remedy, a district court violates the mandate rule
when it orders an additional remedy beyond that
contemplated by the appellate panel's opinion. See
Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct.
1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948); Schake v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp. Severance Plan for Salaried Emps.,
960 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir.1992); Stiller v. .Squeez-APurse Corp., 296 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1961). Since
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Rochow had abandoned his claim for disgorgement
under § 1132(a)(3) by not seeking its resolution in the
district court after that court treated a motion for
"partial" summary judgment as one warranting summary judgment on all issues and by not raising the
district court's failure to resolve the breach of fiduciary duty claim on appeal, the district court violated
the mandate rule when it ordered disgorgement.
Our mandate issued on May 3, 2007. Over seven
years later this case is still being litigated. The majority's charitable view of the case's procedural history allows that unfortunate history to continue with
some legitimacy. In short, while I agree with the
majority's analysis if one accepts its accommodations
in footnote 1 to reposition the case for en bane review,
I am unable to refrain from presenting another take
on the history of this case, one which would preclude
the district court's jurisdiction to order any further
relief, except the prejudgment interest directed by the
majority opinion.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring m
part and dissenting in part.
I write separately because I do not entirely agree
or disagree with either the majority or dissenting
opinion. I would vacate the judgment on the basis
that the order of disgorgement is not adequately
supported. I would, however, permit consideration of
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a refashioned disgorgement remedy on remand if
properly supported. 1
There is less light between the two opinions than
might appear on the surface. The majority understands Rochow's fiduciary-duty claim as a repackaging of his benefits-denial claim, for which it believes
Rochow obtained adequate relief as a result of
Rockow I, 482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007), and a potential
award of prejudgment interest on remand. Operating
under this conclusion, the majority holds the district
court erred when it ordered LINA to disgorge its
profits because ERISA, in its view, precludes "a
duplicative or redundant remedy . . . to redress the
same injury." Maj. Op. 373. The majority opinion does
not, however, appear to foreclose disgorgement as
an appropriate equitable remedy under § 502(a)(3) in
some cases. The dissent too interprets ERISA to
authorize equitable relief, including disgorgement of
profits, to remedy distinct injuries, such as a plan
administrator's breach of a fiduciary duty owed to
plan participants and beneficiaries. Thus, all appear
to agree disgorgement of profits is a potential remedy
under ERISA. The two opinions part on whether
Rochow's fiduciary-duty claim is merely a repackaging of his benefits-denial claim. This, I believe, is a
false dichotomy that imposes a requirement not found
in ERISA.
1 This is not to say that such a remedy would be appropriate, only that it might be and that I would not foreclose it at this
point.
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I do not agree that the dispositive inquiry governing the availability of equitable relief under
§ 502(a)(3) is whether the cla~m is a repackaging of a
benefits-denial claim. Rather, the governing inquiry
under ERISA is whether other equitable relief is.
appropriate under the circumstances, and the extent
to which the equitable disgorgement claim duplicates
the benefits-denial claim is one factor to be considered in making that determination.
The statutory framework that authorizes "other
appropriate equitable relief" confides the determination whether and what equitable relief is appropriate
to judges, who presumably are well equipped to determine when a particular set of circumstances
warrants additional relief by focusing on ERISA's
objectives. This understanding of and respect for the
discretionary role of the courts in evaluating claims
for equitable relief is consistent with the Supreme
Court's statements in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996), which
contemplate courts' sound exercise of their discretion
in fashioning appropriate equitable relief:
We should expect that courts, in fashioning
"appropriate" equitable relief, will keep in
mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans, and will respect the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of
certain remedies and the exclusion of others.
Thus, we should expect that where Congress
elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need
for further equitable relief, in which case
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such relief normally would not be "appropriate."
ld. at 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Varity does not require a
showing of a "s·eparate and distinct" injury. Maj. Op.
372; cf. id. at 371 (recognizing that Varity "emphasized that ERISA remedies are concerned with the
adequacy of relief to redress the claimant's injury").
Rather, it speaks of injury for which adequate relief
has not been elsewhere provided, uses the qualifying
terms "likely'' and "normally," and ultimately focuses
on the governing word "appropriate." We should,
therefore, address whether additional equitable relief
is appropriate here, even discuss the types of considerations that should guide the determinations
whether and what equitable relief is appropriate, but
we should not preemptively disallow equitable remedies in particular circumstances where ERISA has
not done so .

. Nevertheless, the majority fashions a bifurcated
standard, holding that a breach-of-fiduciary-duty
claim is actionable under§ 502(a)(3) where the claim
is based on "an injury separate and distinct from the
denial of benefits or where the remedy afforded by
Congress under § 502(a)(1)(B) is otherwise shown to
be inadequate." Id. at 372 (second emphasis added). I
find this standard both confusing and unnecessary. If
the remedy afforded by Congress under§ 502(a)(1)(B)
is adequate, it should not matter that the beneficiary suffered an injury separate and distinct from
the denial of benefits; I doubt the majority intends
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otherwise. Conversely, if the remedy afforded by
Congress under § 502(a)(l)(B) is inadequate, it also
should not matter whether the claimant suffered
distinct injuries. Ultimately the question must rest
on the majority's second inquiry- whether the "remedy afforded by Congress under § 502(a)(l)(B) is
otherwise shown to be inadequate." I have no doubt
that whether the beneficiary suffered multiple injuries is a factor that is relevant to the ultimate question whether § 502(a)(l)(B) provides adequate relief.
But the majority's focus on whether a fiduciary's
breach of its duties in denying benefits and then
withholding them are "separate and distinct" injuries
or a single injury seems irrelevant in light of its
conclusion that Rochow failed to show that the relief
already received together with the relief that might
be awarded on remand is inadequate. The majority
implicitly acknowledges the dispositive inquiry with
its conclusion that Rochow made "no showing that the
benefits [he] recovered ... , plus the attorney's fees
awarded, plus the prejudgment interest that may be
awarded on remand, are inadequate to make [him]
whole." Id. at 371-72.
Further undermining the separate-and-distinctinjury requirement for relief under § 502(a)(3) is the
majority's acknowledgement that a plaintiff who
recovers benefits under§ 502(a)(l)(B) can also obtain
"other appropriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3)
in the form of prejudgment interest, an- equitable
remedy. The majority allows an interest award even
as it asserts that Rochow suffered only one injury
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that was "adequately remedied under § 502(a)(l)(B),"
and that he "did not suffer [a separate and distinct]
injury remediable under § 502(a)(3)." Id. at 374-75.
Clearly, Rochow was not made whole by the award of
benefits and attorney's fees. Nearly seven years
elapsed between the time he sought benefits and
when LINA finally paid all benefits that were due.
Further equitable relief is necessary to compensate
Rochow for LINA's extraordinary delay in paying
benefits. The majority concedes as much in its remand order directing the district court to consider the
award of interest, although it leaves the ultimate
determination to the district court. But, having ·acknowledged the possibility that delay in payment
might require further appropriate equitable relief,
the majority does not explain why one equitable
remedy (interest) may be appropriate in a benefitsdenial case, but another equitable remedy (disgorgement) is never appropriate in such a case, except to
say that there is only one injury.
There is a valid distinction between the two
equitable remedies that has nothing to do with
whether there is an injury separate and distinct from
the denial of benefits: Interest is generally compensatory, while disgorgement is generally geared toward
deterring future misconduct. See Drennan v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 253 (6th Cir.1992); The
Law of Trusts and Trustees§ 484. I share the majority's concern that Congress· did not intend to turn the

routine denial of benefits into the basis for a recovery
of benefits and also an array of equitable relief, but I
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would direct that concern to the question whether, in
light of the historic distinction between the two
equitable remedies, disgorgement constitutes "other
appropriate equitable relief" under the facts of a
particular case, and would refrain from announcing
what appears to be a blanket rule that bars equitable
relief in a benefits-denial case.
Turning to the instant case, the district court did
not find that disgorgement of profits is necessary to
make Rochow whole, or that Rochow could have
earned the same rate of return had he been paid his
benefits on time. 2 Rather, the court's primary basis for
awarding further equitable relief was LIN.Ns unjust
enrichment, Order, R. 67 at 5-6, and the disgorgement of profits was largely based on the fmding that
LINA did not segregate Rochow's wrongfully withheld
benefits and instead left the amount in its general
fund to be used for general operating expenses,
Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 851 F.Supp.2d
1090, 1097-98 (E.D.Mich.2012). The district court
reasoned that LINA earned a rate of return on
Rochow's benefits that it would not have earned had
it segregated the funds in an investment account, and
that because Rochow's money was inseparable from
LIN.Ns money, he is entitled to a percentage of LIN.Ns
return on its investments during this period. However, the district court did not find that either the
2 The circumstances might, however, support a finding that
interest at the actual market rates during the period of delay
would be inadequate compensation for the delay.
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Plan or ERISA required that Rochow's disputed benefits be segregated pending resolution of the claim.
Nor is it apparent on what basis the dissent concludes that LINA engaged in prohibited self-dealing
under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). There has been no finding
that Rochow's disputed benefits constituted "plan
assets," or that LIN.Ns actions in failing to segregate
the disputed benefits and leaving them in the general
· fund constituted self-dealing under ERISA. Without
such findings or further explanation, I cannot agree
that disgorgement is justified based only on the
maxim emphasized by the district court - "if you take
my money and make money with it, your profit belongs to me." Rockow, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1094 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In the absence of such justifications, disgorgement as an equitable remedy in a denial-of-benefits
case should be premised on a finding that the decision
to deny benefits was not only arbitrary and capricious
but also based on impermissible considerations that
call for an equitable judicial response geared toward
deterring similar decision making in the future, as,
for example, where the denial of benefits is not the
product of particular claims evaluators' misguided
evaluations, but rather, an organizational policy to
delay paying valid claims for as long as possible; or
where repeated wrongful denials lead to the conclusion that disgorgement is necessary to assure proper
claims processing in the future. See Hill v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th
Cir.2005); Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins.
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Co., 368 F. 3d 999, 1008 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting 1
Dobbs § 4.3(5), at 611 n.16); Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §51 (2011).
Further, even when these types of considerations
support disgorgement, the court should consider the
effect of disgorgement on innocent participants in the
plan and tailor the remedy accordingly.
To be clear, a finding that disgorgement is an
appropriate remedy in such circumstances would be
based on the totality of the circumstances of the
denial, as well as the consequences of disgorgement,
and would not depend on a fmding of a separ~te and
independent injury, which, although relevant, may or
may not be present.
In sum, to the extent the majority's bifurcated
rule identifies two circumstances or considerations
that might justify an award of additional equitable
relief, I agree that those circumstances or considerations are relevant; however, to the extent the majority
intends to announce a rule that either dictates an
award of additional equitable relief where either of
those circumstances is present or prohibits such an
award where neither is present, I disagree. Ultimately, the governing inquiry is whether additional
equitable relief is appropriate, a decision normally
left to the sound discretion of the district courts, to
be exercised according to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the denial, and subject to review
for abuse of discretion. See Tiemeyer v. Cmty. Mut.
Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1094, 1103 (6th Cir.1993). Addressing
that question, I conclude that the record as it stands

41a
does not support the district court's exercise of its
discretion in awarding the disgorgement ordered
here. Thus, I agree that the order should be vacated. I
would, however, permit the district court to address
on remand the concerns raised here and in the majority opinion, and would not foreclose a disgorgement
remedy as "other appropriate equitable relief" if
properly supported on remand.

STRANCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The issue before us arises under a remedial
statute, fashioned on the precepts of equity, which
empowers a plan participant to bring a civil action to
"recover benefits due" and "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(l)(B) &
(a)(3). In the parlance of ERISA and equity jurisprudence, the remedy is to "make whole" the injured.
Here, Rochow - a company president whose mental
capacity was destroyed over time by a brain infection
- sought disability benefits from LINA starting in
2002. Over five years later, in October 2007, he
received his first benefit payment (a lump sum of over
$300,000), and monthly benefits began. In June 2009,
almost seven years after the disability date and eight
months after Rochow died in October 2008, LINA
paid a second lump sum for underpayment of benefits
approximating $420,000.
Rochow sought, and the district court awarded, a
make-whole remedy for two ERISA violations committed by LINA, failure to pay benefits due and breach of
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fiduciary duty. Based on evidence presented, the
district court found that LINA engaged in deliberate
and willful wrongful acts, created non-existent insurance policy requirements, concocted a knowingly false
rationale for its second denial of benefits, closed the
administrative record without medical input or
evidence, and acted in bad faith. R. 67, Order;
Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 851 F.Supp.2d
1090, 1101 (E.D.Mich.2012). Proceedings in the
district court confirmed that LINA also engaged in
prohibited self-dealing under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) in
the course of delaying payment of Rochow's disability
benefits for more than seven years. During that
lengthy period of delay, rather than segregating the
disability benefits it owed to Rochow in an interestbearing account for his later use, LINA commingled
Rochow's benefits with company funds in a general
equity account used in part for corporate investment.
Because Rochow earned a high salary before the
onset of his disability, LINNs intentional delay in
paying Rochow's substantial disability benefits for
more than seven years allowed LINA to earn millions
of dollars in profit for its own gain, in breach of its
fiduciary duty not to engage in self-dealing. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1104(a)(1), 1106(b). Based on expert evidence, the
district court found that LINNs average rate of return during the seven-year period was 26%. Rochow's
health deteriorated during that time and he was
forced to meet the financial demands of everyday
living and serious illness without employment income
or the disability benefits promised under the Plan.
LINNs fiduciary wrongdoing and self-dealing warrant
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equitable remedies under § 1132(a)(3) - an accounting and disgorgement of the considerable profits
LINA earned on the benefits it withheld from Rochow.
The majority avers that such equitable remedies
are prohibited under ERISA jurisprudence because
obtaining a remedy under both § 1132(a)(1)(B) and
§ 1132(a)(3) amounts to double recovery. Its insistence
that Rochow is not entitled to disgorgement of LINNs
profit under § 1132(a)(3) rests on a faulty premise its assumption that Rochow suffered the single injury
of LINNs arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits. · Maj. Op. at 369-70. The majority states
that, [a]llowing Rochow to recover disgorged profits
under § 502(a)(3), in addition to his recovery under
§ 502(a)(1)(B), based on the claim that the wrongful
denial of benefits also constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, would - absent a showing that the
§ 502(a)(1)(B) remedy is inadequate - result in an
impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to clear
Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. Maj. Op.
at 370-71. Relying primarily on Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996),
and Wilkins v~ Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., 150
F.3d 609 (6th Cir.1998), the majority concludes that
"Rochow is not entitled to relief under the catchall
provision" of § 1132(a)(3) because "such relief is unnecessary and unavailable" and "he has an adequate
remedy under"§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Maj. Op. at 372-73.
I will demonstrate below that Varity Corp. and numerous cases decided after it fully support Rochow's
recovery of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and the
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disgorgement of LIN.Ns profit under § 1132(a)(3).
Wilkins is inapplicable to the issues before us because
it is legally and factually distinguishable. Wilkins
sued for disability benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and
failed to prove that his medical condition warranted
payment of plan benefits. Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 612-13.
Trying a second time to obtain plan benefits, he
"repackaged" the benefits claim as a breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3), but he sought a traditionally legal remedy - compensatory damages. Id. at
613-14. We barred the "repackaging" of the claim
because Wilkins had an adequate remedy to recover
benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and recovery of compensatory damages would not constitute "other appropriate equitable relief" under § 1132(a)(3). Id. at
615-16. Wilkins thus insures that a plan participant
cannot make an end-run around a denial of benefits
under§ 1132(a)(1)(B) by "repackaging" the claim and
seeking compensatory damages under § 1132(a)(3).
In contrast to the facts of Wilkins, LINA injured
Rochow in two distinct ways: by arbitrarily and capriciously denying his disability benefits claim and by
breaching its fiduciary duties to him. LIN.Ns denial of
benefits breached the Plan terms; LIN.Ns breach of its
fiduciary obligations violated ERISA statutes and
added the element of wrongdoing to the contract
breach. Equity has long recognized that "[a] trustee
(or a fiduciary) who gains a benefit by breaching his
or her duty must return that benefit to the beneficiary." Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Retirement
Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.2012). Unlike
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Wilkins, Rochow sued under§ 1132(a)(l)(B) to recover
Plan benefits and under § 1132(a)(3) to obtain an
accounting and disgorgement of profits wrongfully
earned through LINA's breach of its fiduciary dutiestwo separate remedies for two separate injuries under two separate sections of§ 1132. Unlike Wilkins,
Rochow proved that his medical condition warranted payment of Plan benefits. And unlike Wilkins,
Rochow sought his second remedy to attain makewhole relief. These two remedies are not duplicative
and neither repackages the other. Both remedies are
necessary, working in tandem, to make Rochow whole
for LINA's ERISA violations.
By falsely characterizing the wrongs Rochow
suffered and by denying the availability of equitable
remedies, the majority opinion stands at odds with
governing law and with the facts before us. Supreme
Court opinions, our precedent, and cases from our
sister circuits support the availability of dual ERISA
remedies where two distinct injuries exist and two
remedies are necessary to make the plan participant
or beneficiary whole. I would affirm the district court,
but I would remand the case for a recalculation of
the amount of profit LINA must disgorge. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority
op1ruon.
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I.

ERISA DEFINES LINA'S DUTIES AS A
FIDUCIARY

"ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to
promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit -plans." Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77
L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). Congress imposed fiduciary
duties on ERISA plan sponsors and administrators
that are the highest known to the law, Gregg v.
Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 841 (6th
Cir.2003), and in doing so, Congress drew much of
ERIS.Ns content from the common law of trusts.
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496, 116 S.Ct. 1065. These
fiduciary duties attach to particular persons or entities engaged in the performance of specific ERISA
functions. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life. Ins. Co.,
725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir.2013).
A fiduciary's first obligation is to "discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1). This duty of loyalty extends to the
individual plan participants and beneficiaries, not
only to the ERISA plan itself. Varity Corp., 516 U.S.
at 507, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Cent. States, S.E. & S. W.
Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 4 72 U.S.
559, 571-72, 105 S.Ct. 2833, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985). A

fiduciary has "an unwavering duty" to act as a prudent person would act in a similar situation and "for
the exclusive purpose" of insuring that benefits are
provided to plan participants and their beneficiaries.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue
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Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 751 F.3d 740, 751 (6th
Cir.2014); Gregg, 343 F.3d at 841; James v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 448-49 (6th
Cir.2002). ERISA expressly forbids a fiduciary from
"deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account." 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1).
The "absolute bar against self dealing'' prevents a fiduciary from "realizing a financial gain" at the expense of the plan participants or beneficiaries. Hi-Lex
Controls, Inc., 751 F.3d at 750 (quoting Brock v.
Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 341 (6th Cir.1988)); Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Mich., 722 F.3d 861, 868 (6th Cir.2013).
II.

ERISA DEFINES REMEDIES FOR BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

A. Congress authorized equitable remedies
in§ 1132(a)(3)
Congress designed ERISA to include equitable
remedies that run directly to the individual plan
participant or beneficiary who is injured by a fiduciary breach. The Supreme Court tells us that the
"words of[§ 1132(a)(3)] -'appropriate equitable relief'
to 'redress' any 'act or practice which violates any
provision of this title' - are broad enough to cover
individual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation."
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510, 116 S.Ct. 1065. The
structure of § 1132 reveals that one of the two catchall provisions providing appropriate equitable relief
for breaches of fiduciary duty that run to an injured
beneficiary is § 1132(a)(3). Id. at 512, 116 S.Ct. 1065.
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This catchall remedial provision acts "as a safety net,
offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries
caused by violations that[§ 1132] does not elsewhere
adequately remedy." ld.
In the majority's view, Varity Corp. emphasizes
"that ERISA remedies are concerned with the adequacy of relief to redress the claimant's injury" and
that "equitable relief is not ordinarily appropriate
where Congress has elsewhere provided adequate
means of redress for a claimant's injury. In other
words, a claimant cannot pursue a breach-offiduciary-duty claim under § [1132](a)(3) based solely
on an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits
where the § [1132](a)(1)(B) remedy is adequate to
make the claimant whole." Maj. Op. at 371. If that
were the case, the majority worries, then any arbitrary and capricious denial of plan benefits would
potentially subject a plan fiduciary to disgorgement
of profits under § 1132(a)(3) "after the claimant
recovered for wrongful denial of benefits" under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Maj. Op. at 371-72.
This unfounded fear is allayed by a proper interpretation of Varity Corp., the cases following it, and
the Supreme Court's recent decision in CIGNA Corp.
v. Amara, _ U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d
843 (2011). These cases demonstrate that a participant or beneficiary may recover under§ 1132(a)(1)(B)
for an arbitrary and capricious denial of plan benefits and may recover further equitable relief under
§ 1132(a)(3) to redress a breach of fiduciary duty.
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Together these remedies provide the make-whole
relief Congress intended.
In Varity Corp., the plaintiffs' employer, serving
also as administrator of a self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, persuaded the plaintiffs by deception to transfer their employment to a newly-formed
subsidiary, thereby withdrawing· voluntarily from the
welfare benefit plan and forfeiting benefits under it in
exchange for the employer's assurances that the
plaintiffs would receive the same benefits following
transfer. 516 U.S. at 491-94, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Just as
Varity Corporation had planned, the insolvency of the
new subsidiary stripped the employees of welfare
benefits. Id. at 494, 116 S.Ct. 1065. The employees
could not sue under § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits
because the plan was defunct. They could, however,
and did sue for and obtain "appropriate equitable
relief" under § 1132(a)(3) - their reinstatement to a
different employee plan. Id. at 495, 116 S.Ct. 1065.
The Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement,
holding that individuals may sue under the catchall
provision of § 1132(a)(3) to obtain "other appropriate
equitable relief" to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. at 510-13, 116 S.Ct. 1065. Given the objectives
of the ERISA statute, the case explains, "it is hard to
imagine why Congress would want to immunize
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals
by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy." Id. at 513,
116 S.Ct. 1065.
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Like the majority here, the amici in Varity Corp.
worried that an individual would be able to "repackage" a denial of benefits claim that is normally
reviewed deferentially under the arbitrary and capricious standard of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80
(1989), and transform it into a breach of fiduciary
duty claim decided under the "rigid level of conduct"
expected of fiduciaries. Id. at 513-14, 109 S.Ct. 948.
The Supreme Court dismissed their concern.
"[C]haracterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of
fiduciary duty does not necessarily change the standard a court would apply when reviewing the administrator's decision to deny benefits." Id. at 514, 109
S.Ct. 948. "Mter all, Firestone ... based its decision
upon the same common-law trust doctrines that
govern standards of fiduciary conduct." I d. at 514-15,
109 S.Ct. 948. Dismissing amici's concern that "lawyers will complicate ordinary benefit claims by dressing them up in 'fiduciary duty' clothing," id. at 514,
109 S.Ct. 948, the Court explained "that where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further
equitable relief, in which case such relief normally
would not be 'appropriate.'" I d. at 515, 109 S.Ct. 948
(emphasis added).
The majority transforms the Supreme Court's
conditional language into an absolute bar to Rochow's
claims, misconstruing the Court's instruction that
ERISA authorizes "further equitable relief" if relief
available "elsewhere" is inadequate. This may be the
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unusual case that entails two InJUries, but Varity
Corp. provides no basis for denying an equitable
remedy necessary to accomplish make-whole relief.
The repackaging fears the majority expresses, like
those raised by amici in Varity Corp., should be met
with the same response: there is not "any ERISArelated purpose that denial of a remedy would serve.
Rather, ... granting a remedy is consistent with the
literal language of the statute, the Act's purposes, and
pre-existing trust law." ld.
B. Remedies under§ 1182(a)(8) were traditionally available in equity

Section 1132(a)(3) "countenances only such relief
as will enforce" ERIS.Ns provisions or the terms of the
plan, and it "authorizes the kinds of relief 'typically
available in equity' in the days of 'the divided bench,'
before law and equity merged." US Airways, Inc. v.
McCutchen,_ U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1544, 1548,
185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt
Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d
161 (1993)). The most definitive explanation of the types
of equitable remedies available under ·§ 1132(a)(3)
is found in the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Cigna Corp. v. Amara, _ U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 1866,
179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Because Congress specified
that courts may grant "other appropriate equitable
relief" under§ 1132(a)(3), courts may employ remedies
that were traditionally available in equity, including
reformation of contract, injunctions, mandamus, restitution, and surcharge, which is a monetary remedy

52 a
against a trustee or fiduciary. Id. at 1878-80. "[T]he
fact that this relief takes the form of a money payment does not remove it from the category of traditionally equitable relief." Id. at 1880. This is because
courts sitting in equity "possessed the power to
provide relief in the form of monetary 'compensation'
for a loss resulting from a trustee's breach of duty,
or to prevent the trustee's unjust enrichment."
Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95, and
Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009)). The
surcharge remedy extends "to a breach of trust committed by a fiduciary encompassing any violation of a
duty imposed upon that fiduciary" and can be used to
accomplish "make-whole relief." Id. The equity courts
did not require a showing of detrimental reliance in
surcharge cases but "would 'mold the relief to protect
the rights of the beneficiary according to the situation
involved.'" I d. at 1881 (quoting Bogert's Trusts &
Trustees § 861, at 4). A fiduciary may be surcharged
under§ 1132(a)(3) if the plaintiff proves actual harm
and causation by a preponderance of the evidence,
and actual harm might "come from the loss of a right
protected by ERISA or its trust-law antecedents." I d.
In explain~ng the scope of equitable remedies
available under § 1132(a)(3), Amara also clarified two
previous Supreme Court cases, correcting lower court
decisions that had interpreted the cases as narrowing
the scope of "other appropriate equitable relief" available under § 1132(a)(3). Amara, 131 S.Ct. at 1878 (referring to Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 113
S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993), and Great-West
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Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122
S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002)). Mertens does not
foreclose equitable relief against a plan fiduciary, as
some courts had held, because in that case a plan
beneficiary sought compensatory damages from a
non-fiduciary, a private firm that provided actuarial
services to a trustee. Id. (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at
253, 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063). Relief was not available under§ 1132(a)(3) because the beneficiary sought
traditionally legal, not equitable relief, against a nonfiduciary. I d. In Great-West, the suit was brought by
the fiduciary against the beneficiary. Mter the injured
beneficiary recovered compensatory damages from a
tortfeasor, the fiduciary sought reimbursement for
the medical expenses it had paid on the beneficiary's
behalf. Id. The fiduciary tried to place a lien on the
money the beneficiary collected, but a lien is traditionally considered to be legal, not equitable, relief.
Id. at 1878-79. Because the fiduciary did not seek an
equitable remedy - the placement of a constrt;tctive
trust on the particular money the tortfeasor paid to
the beneficiary- the Court determined that equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) was not available. ld.
Mertens and Great-West thus do not present any
obstacle to Rochow's use of § 1132(a)(3) to recover
traditional equitable relief from LINA, a breaching
fiduciary, even if that remedy is formulated to avoid
the unjust enrichment of the fiduciary. See Amara,
131 S.Ct. at 1879-80.
Reading Amara and Varity Corp. together, we see
that the remedies awarded to Rochow comport with
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the statute, its purposes, and trust law. The principle
is clear that a plaintiff may pursue relief under both
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) if wrongly denied benefits
are recovered under (a)(1)(B) and "other appropriate
equitable relief"- something in addition to the award
of benefits - is necessary to make the plaintiff whole
for a breach of fiduciary duty. In this case, requiring
LINA to disgorge its profits earned on wrongly withheld benefits, accomplished under (a)(3), was necessary to make Rochow whole and to prevent LIN.Ns
unjust enrichment.
Our sister circuits recognize that Amara corrects
misunderstandings of the lower courts that have led
to the denial · of equitable remedies authorized by
§ 1132(a)(3). Mter Amara, the Fourth Circuit explained, it is clear "that Section § 1132(a)(3) allows
for remedies traditionally available at equity and that
those remedies include surcharge and estoppel[,]"
remedies "at the heart" of the appeal before that
court. McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F. 3d 176,
177-78 (4th Cir.2012). The Fifth Circuit characterized
Amara as stating "an expansion of the kind of relief
available" under § 1132(a)(3) "when the plaintiff is
suing a plan fiduciary and the relief sought makes
the plaintiff whole for losses caused by the defendant's breach of a fiduciary· duty." Gearlds v. Entergy
Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir.2013). The
Seventh Circuit pointed to Amara as "clarify[ing] that
equitable relief may come in the form of money damages when the defendant is a trustee in breach of a
fiduciary duty." Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc.,
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722 F.3d 869, 878-79 (7th Cir.2013). The Eighth Circuit observed that "Amara changed the legal landscape by clearly spelling out the possibility of an
equitable remedy under[§ 1132(a)(3)] for breaches of
fiduciary obligations by plan administrators." Silva v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir.2014).
And the Ninth Circuit recently reversed and remanded an ERISA case in part so that the district
court could determine in the first instance under
§ 1132(a)(3) whether a trustee's fiduciary breach
injured the beneficiary and whether the surcharge
remedy discusse.d in Amara is available to the beneficiary. Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d
945, 962-63 (9th Cir.2014).
Members in the majority here have read Amara
to leave "open the possibility that 'appropriate equitable relief' could potentially be awarded" under
§ 1132(a)(3). Lipker v. AK Steel Corp., 698 F. 3d 923,
931 n. 4 (6th Cir.2012). In this case, the majority
agrees with Lipker and the other circuit cases cited
above that equitable relief is available under
§ 1132(a)(3) "to redress an ERISA violation by a plan
fiduciary." Maj. Op. at 374. And two of our prior cases
acknowledge the availability of dual ERISA claims
and remedies under certain circumstances. In Hill v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710,
718 (6th Cir.2005), we reversed the dismissal of a
claim under § 1132(a)(3), because that claim challenged defects in systemic, plan-wide claims-handling

procedures, an injury different from the denial of claims
for individual benefits brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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Similar reasoning is apparent in Gore v. El Paso
Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 4 77 F. 3d
833, 840-41 (6th Cir.2007), where we determined that
the plaintiff asserted two distinct injuries permitting
claims and recovery under both § 1132(a)(l)(B) and
(a)(3). We thus learn from our own cases that ERIS.Ns
remedy provisions are not mutually exclusive.

III. LINA BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY
TOROCHOW
The majority nonetheless denies relief on the
ground that "Rochow did not suffer an injury remediable" under § 1132(a)(3). Maj. Op. at 374. That
statement is plainly contrary to the factual record
and extensive case law concerning the types of injuries that plan participants or beneficiaries may redress through equitable remedies available under
§ 1132(a)(3).
We previously recognized that LINA breached its
fiduciary duties, Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
482 F.3d 860, 866 (6th Cir.2007) ("Rockow I"), and the
majority acknowledges as much. Maj. Op. at 366-67.
We ruled in the earlier appeal that LIN.Ns decision to
deny Rochow disability benefits was not made solely
in Rochow's interest - in other words, LINA breached
its duty of loyalty to Rochow - and LIN.Ns decision
to deny benefits was not made for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to Rochow as required by
§ 1104(a)(l). Rockow I, 482 F.3d at 866.
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The majority opinion and the concurrence point
out that this case comes to us with a complex procedural history, pockmarked by irregularities. While I
don't disagree that the case is procedurally complex, I
do disagree with the conclusion that the district court
reached a final judgment prior to our decision in
Rockow I and that it violated the mandate rule by
permitting the parties to litigate the disgorgement
remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty claim after
Rockow I. To be sure, the district court clerk docketed
a separate document entitled "Judgment" on the
same day that the district court entered the summary
judgment order later affirmed in Rockow I, but the
"record demonstrates ... that [this] document was
not a judgment but a mere clerical error." Pkilkall
Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 210, 213 (6th
Cir.1976). The court had ruled on LINA's liability in
the context of Rochow's motion for partial summary
judgment and LINA's cross-motion for summary
judgment. The court had not made the requisite determination of the remedy. With this important issue
outstanding, certainly the district court did not
"intend[] the document to be a final judgment." I d.;
15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.28 (2d ed.) ("[A]
summary judgment that determines liability but
leaves damages or other relief open for further proceedings is not final.")
Moreover, the document purporting to be a final
judgment "was not legally sufficient to constitute a
final judgment." Pkilkall Corp., 546 F.2d at 213. The
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Supreme Court has instructed that "it is necessary to
determine whether the language ... (of any purported judgment) embodies the essential elements of
a judgment for money and clearly evidences the
judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the
case. If it does so, it constitutes his final judgment."
Id. (quoting United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d
721 (1958)). "[A] final judgment for money must, at
least, determine or specify the means for determining, the amount." F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356
U.S. at 233, 78 S.Ct. 674. As in Philhall Corp., 546
F.2d at 213, the document entered by the clerk below
"did not have the indicia of a final judgment" because
it failed to state that Rochow had prevailed and it did
not memorialize any monetary award. Instead, the
document erroneously "dismissed" the case, clearly
contradicting the district court's summary judgment
order fmding in favor of Rochow on liability. LINA
filed a notice of appeal, effectively divesting the
district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the
litigation pending resolution of the appeal.
Mter our mandate issued in Rockow I, the concurrence posits, the district court lacked jurisdiction
to take any further action in the case by operation of
the mandate rule. The Hamilton case cited in the
concurrence points out that the mandate rule is "discretionary, rather than jurisdictional," United States
v. Hamilton, 440 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir.2006), and we
have said the same thing, albeit in an unpublished
case. Mylant v. United States, 48 Fed.Appx. 509, 512
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(6th Cir.2002) (observing that the mandate rule is one
of "policy and practice, not a jurisdictional limitation"). "The basic tenet of the mandate rule is that a
district court is bound to the scope of the remand
issued by the court of appeals." United States v.
Campbell, 168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1999). The
concurrence recognizes that the Rockow I panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment order on liability and did not issue any type of remand to
the district court. Although the district court was
bound to honor our Rockow I decision in completing
the litigation, as "with all applications of the law of
the case doctrine," the district court could "consider
those issues not decided expressly or impliedly by the
appellate court." Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262
(6th Cir.1992). Taking up the case again after the
Rockow I appeal, the district court determined with
fmality a monetary award for Rochow that included
disgorgement for LINA's fiduciary breach. The court's
final decision in no way conflicted with the Rockow I
mandate. In this second appeal, a panel of our court
affirmed the district court's final decision, Rockow v.
LINA, 737 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.2013) ("Rockow II"), and
that same final decision is presently before us for en
bane review. Consequently, any procedural missteps
that occurred earlier in the case are ultimately immaterial for purposes of our en bane decision.
Contrary to the majority's assertion that the district court failed to identify any grounds to support a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, Rochow asks us to affirm the district court's findings that LINA's conduct

60a
involved a number of deliberate and willful wrongful
acts, including requiring Rochow to meet insurance
policy requirements that did not exist, devising a
knowingly false rationale for denying his benefits
appeal, and acting without appropriate medical input
or evidence. R. 67, Order; Rockow, 851 F.Supp.2d at
1101. On the record before us, these findings are not
clearly erroneous. See Cultrona v. Nationwide Life
Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2014). LINA's
fiduciary wrongdoing, separate from its arbitrary and
capricious denial of plan benefits, warrants an equitable remedy under § 1132(a)(3).
IV. BREACH

OF FIDUCIARY
QUIRES A REMEDY

DUTY

RE-

Persisting in the fiction that Rochow seeks to
recover twice for the same injury, the majority incorrectly posits that "the district court thus treated its
finding of an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, in and of itself, as a breach of fiduciary duty," and
claims to be unaware of any "persuasive authority for
the proposition that a wrongful denial of benefits in
and of itself constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty."
Maj. Op. at 370 n. 1. Even if that were the issue- and
it is not because LINA engaged in fiduciary misconduct in addition to denying Rochow's benefits - at

least four circuits besides our own (the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Eighth) recognize that a fiduciary's
arbitrary and capricious delay in paying benefits due
under a plan in itself can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. I begin with our own precedent.
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More than twenty years ago we stated the wellestablished principle that "ERISA requires that a
retirement plan be operated for the exclusive benefit
of the employees and beneficiaries." Sweet v. Consol.
Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir.l990).
Although we assumed there that a trustee acted
prudently in withholding pension funds until a certain date, we nonetheless held that the delay in
payment conferred a benefit on the trustee. Id. "Any
additional time one gains, rightfully or wrongfully, in
not having to submit payment of a sum of money
owed another is without doubt a benefit. Moreover,
the payee ... has been deprived of the benefit of those
payments." Id. We expressly held that "[t]o allow the
Fund to retain the interest it earned on funds wrongfully withheld from a beneficiary would be to approve
of an unjust enrichment. Further, the relief granted
would fall short of making the beneficiary whole
because he has been denied the use of money which
was his." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ten years after Sweet we upheld a district court's
decision reqUiring an ERISA fiduciary to pay to the
plan participant class certain benefits along with the
rate of return the fiduciary actually realized on the
use of that withheld money. Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc.,
235 F.3d 975, 977-78, 986 (6th Cir.2000). TRW argued
that imposing the actual rate of return was "unprecedented," id. at 986, but we disagreed, pointing to the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Lorenzen v. Employees
Retirement Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d
228 (7th Cir.1990). In that case an employee's widow
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contended that the administrator of a retirement plan
violated its fiduciary duties to her and to her deceased husband causing a loss in retirement benefits.
Id. at 230. The Seventh Circuit held that § 1132(a)(3)
authorizes a civil action by a participant or beneficiary to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" for a
violation of plan terms and that equitable relief to
remedy a breach of fiduciary duty can include a
payment of money. Id. (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 4 73 U.S. 134, 154 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87
L.Ed.2d 96 (1985)). Because the retirement plan had
held money that belonged to the widow, the Seventh
Circuit stated: "Now that the collateral dispute is
over, the plan must return [the money] to her together
with the fruits that it has gleaned by holding on to it."
Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). Relying on this
passage from Lorenzen and our own prior opinion on
unjust enrichment, Sweet, 913 F.2d at 270, we held
that using the rate of return "actually realized by
TRW on the relevant funds seems an appropriate way
of avoiding unjust enrichment." Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d
at 986. Importantly, we said that requiring TRW to
pay the actual rate of return "merely deprives TRW
of its profit on the wrongfully denied benefits." I d.
(emphasis added). We decided this approach was
equitable, not punitive, and appropriate under the
circumstances where TRW "would arguably receive a
windfall" if we permitted TRW to pay compensation
for the delayed payment of benefits to the plaintiff
that was lower than TRW's actual rate of return. Id.
at 987.
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Sweet and Rybarczyk align closely with the law of
our sister circuits. The Second Circuit considered a
case in which MetLife denied benefits for nearly five
years after submission of a claim, but then reversed
its prior denials without explanation and paid retroactive benefits in a lump sum without compensating
the claimant for the delay in payment. Dunnigan v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F. 3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.2002).
Having received disability payments after almost five
years of delay, Dunnigan filed suit under§ 1132(a)(3)
alleging that MetLife breached its fiduciary duties by
delaying payment and MetLife was unjustly enriched
through its breach. Id. at 226-27. Dunnigan asked for
a constructive trust on the amount MetLife earned by
failing to pay the delayed benefits when due or,
alternatively, restitution equal to the amount MetLife
earned on the late payment and/or disgorgement of
MetLife's profits. Id. at 227. The Second Circuit ruled
that MetLife's delay in paying benefits long after
Dunnigan was entitled to receive them constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty because the "delay enriche[d]
the fiduciary at the expense of the beneficiary." I d. at
230. The court further concluded that no showing of
bad faith by MetLife was required in order for
Dunnigan to prevail, id. at 229-30, and she was
entitled to an "equitable make-whole remedy" under
§ 1132(a)(3) for MetLife's breach of fiduciary duty. I d.
at 229. The court vacated the dismissal of Dunnigan's
suit and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 232.
The Seventh Circuit reached similar decisions in
two cases, Clair v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 190
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F.3d 495 (7th Cir.1999), and May Department Stores
Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 305 F. 3d 597 (7th
Cir.2002), both involving § 1132(a)(3) claims for equitable remedies in addition to payment of benefits. In
Clair, participants in a defined-contribution retirement plan sued for breach of fiduciary duty because
their benefits were not paid to them in a timely
fashion and no compensation for the delay was offered. Clair, 190 F.3d at 496-97. The participants
characterized their remedy as "restitution of the
wrongful gain that the plan obtained by having the
interest-free use of money rightfully theirs under the
terms of the plan." I d. at 498. Explaining that restitution can be either legal or equitable, the court noted
that restitution is equitable when the person seeking
the remedy complains of a breach of trust, as the
plaintiffs did. Id. Constructive trust "is an equitable
remedy commonly sought and granted in cases of
unjust enrichment. It operates much like restitution
- indeed it is sometimes referred to as a restitutionary remedy, but it is securely equitable because
it is never a legal remedy." Id. (citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs,
Law of Remedies § 4.3, at 587 (2d ed.1993)). According to the Seventh Circuit, "such relief is squarely
within the scope of" § 1132(a)(3). Id. at 499. Although
the plaintiffs in Clair did not prevail on the merits,
the court determined that they were "entitled to
maintain this suit" under § 1132(a)(3). Id.
In May Department Stores Co., 305 F. 3d at 603,
the Seventh Circuit followed Clair and the Second
Circuit's Dunnigan opinion to conclude that the
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"wrongful withholding of benefits due can entitle the
beneficiary to impose a constructive trust on interest
on the withheld benefits, an equitable remedy that
results in a money payment to the plaintiff" under
§ 1132(a)(3). The court explained:
By withholding benefits, a plan can obtain
interest that would otherwise be obtained by
the beneficiary. That interest is not itself a
benefit, and so the beneficiary cannot bring a
suit under (a)(l)(B) to recover it. But he can
sue to recover it under (a)(3), because it is an
amount by which the plan has unjustly enriched itself, and unjust enrichment is a basis, indeed the usual basis, for imposing a
constructive trust on a sum of money.

Id. at 603 (citing Wsol v. Fiduciary Mgt. Assoc., Inc.,
266 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.2001), and Fisher v.
Trainor, 242 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.2001)).
The same principles govern in the Third Circuit.
In Fotta v. Trustees of United Mine Workers of America, 165 F.3d 209, 211 (3d Cir.1998), a plan participant invoked § 1132(a)(l)(B) and § 1132(a)(3) to recover compensation for delayed payment of benefits
where the benefits ultimately were paid without litigation. The Third Circuit determined that § 1132(a)(3)
was "the appropriate vehicle" to recover monetary
compensation for delayed benefits because such an
award "serves to prevent unjust enrichment. Restitution - the traditional remedy for unjust enrichment is widely, if not universally, regarded as a tool of
equity." Id. at 213 (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
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Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570, 110
S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) ("Money damages
are considered equitable when 'they are restitutionary.'")). The court rejected the notion that it was
engrafting a remedy on a statute that Congress did
not. intend to provide. Id. at 214. Rather, the court
determined that it "effectuate[d] ERIS.Ns objectives
by recognizing, under principles of equity, that beneficiaries should be fully compensated and that any
unjust enrichment of plans at beneficiaries' expense
should be avoided." Id. Accordingly, relying on
§ 1132(a)(3), the court held "that a beneficiary of an
ERISA plan may bring an action for interest on
delayed benefits payments ... irrespective of whether
the beneficiary also seeks to recover unpaid benefits.
Because the remedy we recognize here is equitable in
nature, its award involves an exercise of judicial
discretion." Id.
Significantly, Supreme Court Justice Alito, then a
circuit judge on the Third Circuit, concurred in the
Fotta opinion, observing:
If the plaintiff in this case can establish that
the trustees violated the plan by failing to
pay his benefits on time, an award of interest
would constitute "appropriate equitable relief." Such an award is recognized as appropriate equitable relief in comparable
circumstances under the law of trusts. See
Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 207 at 4 70
(1959); 3 Austin Wakeman Scott and William
Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 207.1
at 262-63 (4th ed.1987); Nedd v. United Mine
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Workers of America, 556 F.2d 190, 207 (3d
Cir.1977); Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d
801, 810 (Minn.1985). Thus, this is not a case
like Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 4 73 U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87
L.Ed.2d 96 (1985), in which we were asked to
supplement the remedies specified in the
statute.
Id. at 215.
In addition to the Second, Third and Seventh
Circuits, the Eighth Circuit also adheres to the
proposition that a fiduciary's delay in paying benefits
due under a plan constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty that may be rectified through an action filed
under § 1132(a)(3). "It is undisputed that an accounting for profits - the remedy that allows for the disgorgement of profits awarded by the district court- is
a type of relief that was typically available in equity
and therefore is appropriate under § 1132(a)(3)(B)."
Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368
F.3d 999, 1008 (8th Cir.2004). "An accounting for
profits is one of a category of traditionally restitutionary remedies in equity, and is often invoked in
conjunction with a constructive trust." Id. The court
explained that "[a]n accounting is imposed when the
property subject to the constructive trust produces
profits while in the defendant's possession. The defendant is forced to disgorge those profits, although it
is not necessary for the plaintiff to identify any par-

ticular res or fund of money holding the profits." I d.
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Significantly, "[u]nder traditional rules of equity,
a defendant who owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff may be forced to disgorge any profits made by
breaching that duty, even if the defendant's breach
was simply a failure to perform its obligations under
a contract. I d. (emphasis added)." If a. fiduciary
breaches a contract and also breaches a fiduciary
duty, that fiduciary can be forced to disgorge the
profits he earned as a result of his wrong. Id. (quoting
1 Dobbs § 4.3(5), at 611 n.16). "The important ingredient added by the fiduciary status, however, is not
that status in itself; what is added is wrongdoing as
distinct from contract breach." Id. at 1008-09 (quoting
1 Dobbs§ 4.3(5), at 611 n.16; Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233
U.S. 705, 709, 34 S.Ct. 750, 58 L.Ed. 1163 (1914))
("holding that a 'proper case for equitable relief'
existed where the defendant breached a fiduciary
duty to the plaintiff by failing to pay money owing
under the contract"). Based on these principles, the
Eighth Circuit held that First Reliance owed a fiduciary duty to Parke, First Reliance breached that duty,
and First Reliance could be forced under § 1132(a)(3)
to disgorge its profits earned as a result of the breach.
Id. at 1009. See also Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 212-14 (3d Cir.2004) (following Fotta and Parke to hold that an ERISA beneficiary could force disgorgement of profits earned on
withheld benefits). As do several other circuits, the
Eighth Circuit authorizes the remedy that the district
court below awarded to Rochow.
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Thus, our own cases and a litany of others from
four of our sister circuits undermine the majority's
premise that no legal basis exists to conclude that
LINA's delay in payment of benefits to Rochow constituted both an arbitrary and capricious denial of plan
benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and a breach of LINA's
fiduciary duties remediable under § 1132(a)(3). The
majority ignores these cases because they correct the
majority's mistaken impression that the district
court's "award reflects concern that LINA had wrongfully gained something, a consideration beyond the
ken of ERISA make-whole remedies." Maj. Op. at 371.
Not only does the district court's award appropriately
address LINA's wrongful gain at Rochow's expense,
but the relief for the wrongful gain falls squarely
within ERISA's equitable remedies, as recognized by
the Supreme Court, our court, and other circuits.
"ERISA's duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary from profiting even if no loss to the plan occurs," and the remedy
of disgorgement exists to deprive "wrongdoers of
ill-gotten gains," not "to compensate for a loss." Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 415 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 (7th
Cir.1984) ("ERISA clearly contemplates actions
against fiduciaries who profit by using trust assets,
even where the plan beneficiaries do not suffer direct
fmancial loss."). According to the majority, the payment of benefits, attorney's fees, and prejudgment
interest are sufficient to compensate Rochow for his
injuries. But only the disgorgement of ill-gotten
profits can wholly remedy LINA's breach of its fiduciary duties.
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The court below got it exactly right. By arbitrarily and capriciously failing to pay Rochow benefits
owed under the terms of the plan and by delaying the
payment of full benefits for more than seven years to
enrich itself, LINA violated both the plan terms and
its fiduciary duties under ERISA. LINA's wrongful
gain of profit, earned through breach of its fiduciary
duties, can be equitably remedied under § 1132(a)(3)
by ordering an accounting and by directing LINA to
disgorge the profit and pay it directly to Rochow. See
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 214
n. 2, 122 S.Ct. 708 (recognizing "an accounting for
profits, a form of equitable restitution"). "The elementary rule of restitution is that if you take my money
and make money with it, your profit belongs to me."
Nickel v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 290
F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir.2002).

V.

THE DISGORGEMENT AWARD MUST BE
RECALCULATED

I would return the case to the district court,
however, for a recalculation of the award to Rochow.
The figure awarded by the district court seems to
derive from the total shown on Rochow's corrected
Exhibit A filed on May 25, 2012, plus daily interest
the court added until July 24, 2012, when the court

filed its Order Requiring Disgorgement. R.121-2 Page
ID 3712.
LINA objected below to the corrected Exhibit A,
pointing out several significant errors in it. The most
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conspicuous problem is that full profits are calculated
through March 2012, R. 1212 Page ID 3725 (and by
the court through July 2012), even though Exhibit A
confirms that LINA made all required payments to
Rochow or his estate by September 2009, with the
exception of $2,065.52. R. 121-2 Page ID 3722. The
additional errors LINA identified in its June 2012
filing with the district court? R. 122, may warrant
further reductions in the amount of profits ordered
disgorged by the district court. I would therefore
reverse the award as calculated and remand the case
to the district court for reconsideration.

VI. CONCLUSION
We do not create new, double remedies out of
whole cloth if we affirm the district court's decision to
require LINA to disgorge the profit it earned by
breaching its fiduciary duties to Rochow. Nor will the
sky fall if we affirm this remedy, as the Supreme
Court aptly pointed out in response to the concerns of
amici in Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 513-14, 116 S.Ct.
1065. By recognizing that some few cases may include
claims and remedies for injuries incurred under both
§ 1132(a)(l)(B) and § 1132(a)(3), we simply join the
mainstream view of our sister circuits acknowledging
the trust law principles that undergird ERIS.Ns
equity jurisprudence.
In this case, the disgorgement remedy is appro-

priate based on the evidence and the district court's
fmdings concerning LINA's malfeasance, the length of
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the delay in paying benefits due, and the extraordinary profit LINAreaped from its malfeasance. Practical considerations abound. Allowing LINA to retain
its profit creates an incentive for claims administrators to delay paying much-needed benefits to participants and beneficiaries while investing that money
for their own gain. LINA's conduct undercompensates
the participant or beneficiary by forcing him to absorb expenses incurred as a result of the delay in the
payment of benefits while LINA gains from delaying
the claims process as long as possible. Permitting
LINA to keep its profit also encourages fiduciaries to
commingle plan assets with company funds.
The courts will not often come across a case as
troubling as this one. I recognize, as will district
courts, that disgorgement of profit should be used
sparingly and only when equity requires it. In the
ordinary benefits case - where there is a wrongful
denial of benefits but no breach of fiduciary duties
like the ones here - an award of prejudgment interest
might be sufficient to compensate the beneficiary for
the lost time value of money. See, e.g., Schumacher v.
AK Steel Corp. Retirement Accumulation Pension
Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 679, 686 (6th Cir.2013); Ford v.
Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th
Cir.1998). But where an arbitrary and capricious
denial of benefits is coupled with a breach of fiduciary
duty, as it is here, ERISA provides a make-whole
remedy that includes appropriate equitable relief
under § 1132(a)(3).

Because the majority holds that ERISA bars the
make-whole remedy awarded to Rochow, I respectfully dissent.
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ORDER SETTING METHOD OF ACCOUNTING
ARTHUR J. TARNOW, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court are the competing position
statements of Plaintiff and Defendant with regard to
the proper method of determining equitable accounting. This accounting is for the purpose of correctly
determining the amount of unjust enrichment derived
by Defendant from the wrongful withholding of
disability benefits to Plaintiff, so that Defendant may
disgorge said profits as previously ordered by this
Court. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds
that Defendant has failed to rebut Plaintiff's method
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of accounting and has failed to justify various offsets
to the amount of profits to be disgorged.

I.

Background

This case stems from the wrongful denial of
disability benefits for Plaintiff Daniel Rochow
("Rochow") by Defendant LINA. On June 24, 2005,
this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment [12], finding that Defendant LINA had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Plaintiff
benefits under LIN.Ns long-term disability plan. This
Court's order granting summary judgment was
affirmed in Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482 F. 3d
860 (6th Cir.2007). Subsequent to the mandate from
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiff filed his
Motion for an Equitable Accounting [46] on November
10, 2008. Argument was heard on this motion on
February 5, 2009, and in an Order [67] issued on
June 16, 2009, the Court found that an equitable
accounting and disgorgement by Defendant was an
appropriate remedy.
On August 23, 2010, Defendant [88] and Plaintiff
[89] submitted position statements regarding the
method the court should use to calculate the amount
of unjust enrichment derived by Defendant from its
wrongful withholding of benefits to Plaintiff. Both
Defendant [91] and Plaintiff [92] submitted responses.
On November 4, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary

hearing regarding the parties' positions. Plaintiff
[106] and Defendant [105] submitted supplemental
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briefs on November 18, 2011. On February 3, 2012,
the Court heard additional argument· regarding the
parties' positions on the proper method of equitable
accounting.

II.

Analysis

Unjust enrichment is the principle that "a fiduciary may not profit by his breach of the duty of loyalty." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Murdock, 861
F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.1988). In this case, it has
already been determined that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of loyalty and breached this duty through
its arbitrary and capricious denial of disability bene.fits to Plaintiff. Defendant has, in whole or nearly in
whole, already paid to Plaintiff the actual amount of
benefits that were wrongfully withheld. Thus, the
question before the Court is the amount of financial
benefit that Defendant derived from withholding
benefits to Plaintiff. As set out in this Court's Order
[67] requiring an equitable accounting and disgorgement by Defendant, Defendant is required to remit
any profits derived from Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld benefits. The parties have provided extensive
briefing on how the Court should arrive at this
amount, and have had two opportunities to argue
their positions before the Court.

A. Burden of Proof
An equitable suit for accounting is tried in two
stages. First, the party seeking accounting must
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establish that there is a right to an accounting.
Am.Jur.2d Accounts and Accounting § 66 (2005). This
Court has already found that Plaintiff has a right to
an accounting. Once this right has been established,
Plaintiff must produce evidence from which the Court
can make a "reasonable approximation" of Defendant's unjust enrichment. If a Plaintiff cannot provide
a reasonable approximation, the claim of unjust
enrichment is merely speculative and disgorgement
will not be allowed. However, this "reasonable approximation" is not a high burden. In SEC v. First
City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 (D.C.Cir.1989),
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. CircUit held that a
showing of the "actual profits" on tainted transactions
presumptively shifted the burden to the defendants to
demonstrate why the approximation provided by the
plaintiff (the defendant's actual profits) was not a
reasonable one. Similarly, in Nickel v. Bank of Am.,
290 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.2002), a bank (later acquired
by Bank of America) improperly charged $24,000,000
in fees to various trusts. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the district court's focus on the
"speculative" nature of the disgorgement in question
was incorrect. The court found that focusing on
questions of traceability simply insulated the wrongdoer, the bank, and violated a rule of restitution,
namely "if you take my money and make money with
it, your profit belongs to me." !d. at 1138. The court
also found that if the manner in which the bank had
utilized the money was not traceable, there was
a presumption that the bank was deriving profit
from the funds. Thus, an appropriate remedy was a
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proportional share of the bank's profits for the period
the funds were utilized. Id. at 1139.
Once a reasonable approximation has been
provided, the accounting process proceeds to the
second stage. The burden at this stage switches to the
party "in control of the books" who has "[t]he burden
of proving the correctness of an account." Am.Jur.2d,
Accounts and Accounting § 66 (2005). Defendant has
the burden of proving the correctness of its accounting and methodology of disgorgement because "every
reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of the party
wronged." George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution
§ 2.14, 180 (1978).
Defendant argues that "a plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits is not entitled to defendant's
general profits where it is possible to identify which
of the defendant's profits flowed from the wrongdoing." Def.'s Br. at 5. 1 While true, it is Defendant's
burden to demonstrate which profits flowed from its
wrongdoing; it is not the burden of the Plaintiff. See
Nickel, 290 F.3d at 1138 ("the problem of showing
where the money went is the tortfeasor's problem").
Defendant has failed to do that here.
In similar cases, courts have required violators to
return "all profits" that derive from the tainted
activity. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at
1 References to Plaintiff's and Defendant's briefs refer to
their position statements, docket numbers [88] and [89].
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1232 (requiring defendant to return all profits derived from tainted trades when defendant could not
provide precise measure of profits derived from illegal
trading). Similarly, analyzing a Louisiana law, the
Fifth Circuit has ruled that "the burden is on [a
fiduciary] to demonstrate that application of the
usual rule [of complete disgorgement of profit] will
produce a real injustice." McDonald v. O'Meara, 4 73
F.2d 799, 805-06 (5th Cir.1973). In Leigh v. Engle, 727
F.2d 113 (7th Cir.1984), the court placed the burden of
accounting on the defendant, an ERISA fiduciary. The
court, finding that there would be little reason to
require restitution under ERISA's remedial provision,
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), if "beneficiaries confronted an
insurmountable obstacle in proving the extent of a
fiduciary's profits," and placed "the burden of proof on
the defendants here to ensure that the disgorgement
remedy is effective." Leigh, 727 F.2d at 139; see also
Connelly Mgmt. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan v. N. Am.
Indemnity, N. V., 2008 WL 1336085 (S.D.Ind. Apr. 8,
2008) ("the burden shifts to the defendants to show
that commingled trust assets are not 'profits' subject
to ... disgorgement ... ") (citing Leigh, 727 F.2d at
138-139).
Reasonable Approximation

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to
present a "reasonable approximation" of the unjust
enrichment because Plaintiff has not shown a "casual
connection between LINA's withholding of benefits
and a measurable increase in LINA's profit." Def.'s Br.
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at 3. Defendant compares the situation to one described in Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th
Cir.1983), ·wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that "[i]f General Motors were to steal
your copyright and put it in a sales brochure, you
could not just put a copy of General Motors' corporate
income tax return in the record and rest your case for
an award of infringers' profits." The comparison to
Taylor is inapposite. In Taylor, the plaintiff failed in
any way to attempt to determine what portion of the
defendant's sales were derived from the use of plaintiff's product, and instead simply created a percentage of the defendant's profits that the plaintiff
claimed entitlement to. That is not the case here.
Here, the amount of wrongfully withheld funds are
already known.
At the hearing held on November 4, 2011, Plaintiff set forth a reasonable approximation of the unjust
enrichment gained by Defendant through the withholding of benefits to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did so by
calculating the amount of wrongfully-withheld principal, $910,629.24, which includes base interest on
the principal, and then assumed that this figure,
gradually accumulated over time by Defendant, was
part of Defendant's general equity and used for all
corporate purposes. Plaintiff then calculated Defendant's of profit rate during this period, compared the
percentage gain to the amount of principal owed to
Plaintiff, and arrived at an approximation of $2.1
million dollars of unjust enrichment on the part of
Defendant.
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Based on general principles of accounting, the
burden then shifts to Defendant to provide some
reason why this approximation is not reasonable.

Defendant's "Investment Account" Defense
Defendant's theory regarding why Plaintiff's
approximation is not reasonable is that the money
owed to Plaintiff was confined to an "investment
account" which limited its use and the profits derived
from the use of the money. Defendant asserts that it
places money in these investment accounts, for
instance in the following excerpt from Defendant's
position statement:
When LINA receives premiums from its customers, those premiums are invested in securities to generate investment income while
providing the necessary liquidity to meet
cash flow requirements and pay claims ...
[i]f claims were not paid in a timely manner,
those funds remained in the investment portfolio longer than initially expected and generated increment income - i.e., the causal
connection ... [t]he retained investment income totals $32,732.
Def.'s Br. at 6.
However, at the hearing held on November 4,
2011, it became clear that the idea of an "investment
account" within which the money that Defendant
unlawfully withheld from Plaintiff was kept segregated from Defendant's general account was inaccurate.
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The following is an exchange between Plaintiff's
counsel and Timothy. Holzli, Defendant's expert
witness and Chief Accounting Officer of the Group
Insurance Division at CIGNA Corporation, Defendant's parent company:
Q. All right. There is a procedure at LINA
for setting up a segregated account, is there
not?

A. What do you mean by "segregated account"?
Q. An account that is separated off from
the rest of LINA's investment funds.

A. You used the term there is a separate
account, which is a specific terminology.
Q. But that would be segregated, wouldn't
it?

A. A separate account is a segregated account, yes.
Q. And if that were done and the withheld
benefit payments simply filed up in that account, and that account earned interest say
from a bank that was added into the account,
we could simply go to the bank or go to the
account,· check the records, see what the
principal was and see what it earned over
the time it wasn't paid. Mr. Rochow could
take that and we would be done. Is that
right?

A.

Correct.

83a

Q. All right. In Mr. Rochow's case, LINA
didn't establish a segregated - or, a separate
account until it actually started paying his
benefits, correct?
A. Are you referring to a separate account
now?
Q. Yes.
A. The policy that Mr. Rochow's employer
had with LINA was a general account obligation. So, there would have never been a separate account established under that type of
policy.
Q. Okay. During the time period between
2002 when the claim was filed and late 2007
when LINA started paying on it, did LINA in
any way earmark or segregate the money associated with Mr. Rochow's claim?
A. There's never a segregation in the general
account assets, of assets to a specific beneficiary.
Q. How about earmarking?
A. Not in the general account assets, no.
THE COURT:

Could it go to a reserve?

A. The only reserve that would have been
established at that time, Your Honor, would
have been the incurred, but not the full re-

serve, which is in the aggregate.
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THE COURT: But that would be part of the
aggregate at some point or not?
A. Yes, it would.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Q. And as you sit here today, can you rule
out the possibility that a portion of the funds
LINA owed Mr. Rochow were used to pay for
LIN.Ns ongoing operating expenses?
A.

No.

Q. Okay. And I would like to talk then
about some of the outflows from the investment account.
Is it fair to say that LINA will be paying operating expenses out of the investment account?
A. That's normally how the process in an
insurance company works, yes.
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 119-23.

Thus, it appears that repeated references by
Defendant to an "investment account" from which to
pay claims out are not accurate, or at least are not
accurate with respect to the money that should have
been paid to Plaintiff. Defendant's expert admitted
that the money withheld from Plaintiff was not

segregated in any manner but would have been
present in a general fund from which Defendant could
pay out other claims or even general operating expenses. This seems to be precisely the situation
described in Connelly Mgmt. ·Emp. Welfare Benefit
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Plan, 2008 WL 1336085, at *12 (S.D.Ind. April 8,
2008) ("the burden shifts to the defendants to show
that commingled trust assets are not 'profits' subject
to ... disgorgement ... "). Finally, this seems to be
precisely the situation in which Defendant acknowledged a duty to pay a percentage of all profits: "[A]
plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits is not always
entitled to a percentage of all of the defendant's
profits; rather, a plaintiff is so entitled, if at all, only
where the defendant cannot specifically identify
which of its profits flowed from the breach." Def.'s
Resp. to Pl.'s Br. at 2 (citing Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d
113, 138 (7th Cir.1984)). Defendant cannot specifically identify which of its profits flowed from its wrongful withholding of Plaintiff's benefits.
Defendant has failed to specifically identify
which of its profits flowed from the breach of Defendant's duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's money appears to
have been placed in a general "pot" of equity, which
could have been used for investment or for general
operating expenses or for any other expense by Defendant. Defendant's contention regarding an "investment account" somehow segregated from general
equity appears to be purely theoretical. Defendant
has the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff's
approximation is not reasonable. The Court fmds that
Defendant has failed to meet this burden. Thus, as
discussed below, the Court adopts Plaintiff's method
of determining the profits derived by Defendant from
the use of Plaintiff's unpaid benefits.
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B. Method of Determining Profits
Calculating the amount of unjust enrichment is
the function of four variables, of which the parties
agree ori. the first three. First, the underlying principal amount due from LINA to Plaintiff's estate $910,629.24, which is inclusive of simple interest on
the base payments2 • Second, the amount of time
during which those amounts were unpaid - the
parties agree that the principal should have been
paid in equal monthly installments beginning in
2002. Third, the form of compounding- the parties
agree that compounding of interest on the amount
owed should take place on a monthly basis. Only the
fourth variable is disputed - the amount of Defendant's unjust enrichment derived from use of the
principal that was owed to Plaintiff.

Return on Equity Theory ("ROE")
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's profits from the
use Plaintiff's unpaid benefits should be calculated
using a "Return on Equity Theory." Under ROE
theory, the correct measure of profit is Defendant's
annual rate of growth in its net worth between 2002
and the present, that percentage rate varying annually between 11% and 39%, excluding certain growth in
Plaintiff states that this total amount is the amount of
payments made in multiple installments over three years, and
that Plaintiff is still working to determine if this is the exact
amount of principal. However, both parties seem to agree that
this figure is at least a close approximation.
2
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net worth, such as injection of capital by Defendant's
parent company, CIGNA Corporation.
As discussed above, Plaintiff argues, and Defendant's expert admitted, that the withheld benefits
were retained as funds that went straight to Defendant's ''bottom line" equity. The profit from the withheld benefits could have been used by Defendant for
any and all investments and/or corporate expenses
(thus freeing up other money for investment). A
useful case in analyzing how Defendant's profits
should be determined is Nickel v. Bank of America,
290 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.2002), a case where a bank
improperly overcharged various trusts $24,000,000
over the course of fifteen years. Bank of America
acquired the bank and later refunded the
$24,000,000, along with $17,800,000 in simple interest. The district court agreed to this restitution,
ruling that any account of profits derived from the
improper overcharges would have been too "speculative" and too difficult to track given the relatively
small amounts of various trusts. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, fmdlng that the district court's focus on the
"speculative" nature of the remedy and traceability
simply insulated the wrongdoer in this case, the
bank, and violated a rule of restitution, namely "if
you take my money and make money with it, your
profit belongs to me." Id. at. 1138. The court also
found that if the manner in which the bank had
utilized the money was not traceable, there was a
presumption that the bank was deriving profit from
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the funds. Thus, an appropriate remedy was a proportional share of the bank's profits for the period the
funds were utilized. ld. at 1139.

Retained Investment
Management Theory ("RIM")
Defendant's theory of how its profits should be
measured has already been discussed and rejected
above based on evidence that Defendant did not, in
fact, maintain a separate "investment account" in
which Plaintiff's withheld benefits were placed. The
Court therefore does not accept Defendant's assertions regarding separate "underwriting" and "investment" income. Defendant had argued that its
"retained investment" profit was roughly 1% per year.
Further, Defendant's assertions that unpaid
claims that have been approved for payment are
placed in "investment accounts" used only for limited
investment purposes is inapplicable to the case at
hand: Plaintiff brought suit to recover wrongfully
withheld benefits from Defendant precisely because
the benefits had not been approved by Defendant.
Defendant argues that unpaid benefits that sit in
"investment accounts" then generate only "incremental investment income." Def.'s Hr. at 2. Again: it is
unclear why Plaintiff's unpaid benefits would have
been set aside in an investment account given that
Plaintiff's benefits claim was wrongfully denied.
Moreover, as discussed above, the argument that
Defendant's "investment account" is somehow cabined
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from Defendant's other sources of income and spending is inaccurate:
Q. And as you sit here today, can you rule
out the possibility that a portion of the funds
LINA owed Mr. Rochow were used to pay for
LINA's ongoing operating expenses?

A.

No.

Q. Okay. And I would like to talk then
about some of the outflows from the investment account.

Is it fair to say that LINA will be paying operating expenses out of the investment account?
A. That's normally how the process in an
insurance company works, yes.
Tr. at 123.

The Court rejects Defendant's "Retained Investment Management" theory of profits and accepts
Plaintiff's "Return on Equity'' theory as a baseline
measure of profits gained by Defendant as unjust
enrichment through the use of Plaintiff's wrongfully
withheld benefits. The Court must now determine
whether the various "offsets" proposed by Defendant
should reduce the baseline measure of profits.

C. Offsets
Defendant argues that, regardless of the method
used by the Court to establish baseline profits, the
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profits gained by Defendant as unjust enrichment
through the use of Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld
benefits should be reduced by various "offsets." The
Court will analyze each proposed offset in turn.

Attorney's Fees
Defendant's original position statement and
expert report indicated an offset of $232,000 for
attorney's fees. At the evidentiary hearing held on
November 4, 2011, however, Defendant indicated
through counsel that attorney's fees were not an issue
and "ha[d] never been an issue .... " Tr. at 89. The
Court will therefore not consider attorney's ·fees as a
potential offset.

Discount for Retained Income
Defendant argues that when a claim is approved
it triggers "the establishment of a specific case reserve in Defendant's administrative and financial
system." This reserve is the "present value of the
amount to pay to the claimant over the expected
duration of the claim," but is "discounted," (meaning
that there is actually less in the case reserve than the
actual value of the claim, because money "now" is
worth less than money at the time the claim will be
paid out) and will "increase each year simply due to
the passage of time as the discount is unwound," i.e.,
as money approaches its present value. Def.'s Br. at 4.
Defendant states that the income generated by the
investment portfolio is "therefore intended to offset
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that reserve increase over time . . . only the investment income generated in excess of the amount
needed to offset the unwinding of the discount is truly
retained by LINA" Id. at 4-5. This is true in the sense
that only this amount is "pure profit" for Defendant;
however, Defendant is profiting from ALL the money
in the investment account, not just the amount that it
can retain - the fact that Defendant offsets the payment to discount for payment in the future makes
sense fmancially, but Defendant is benefitting from
that offset by not having to use other funds to make
up the difference in Plaintiff's benefit account.
Regardless, however, much like Defendant's
general claims regarding an "investment account,"
there is no evidence that a "specific case reserve" was
established for Plaintiff's claim. This makes sense as
Plaintiff's claim was not approved by _Defendant. It is
thus unclear why Defendant would have created a
specific case reserve. Moreover, Defendant's expert
admitted during the hearing of November 4, 2011
that no such reserve existed:
Q. So, the money just wasn't building up in
a reserve account up to the point of payment.
It was general equity as to LINA before that,
wasn't it?

A. LINA maintains incurred but not reported reserves, which are reserves in the
aggregate and not associated with a specific
claimant. So. LINA did have reserves on its
books for disability benefits.

92a
Q. But there was no reserves specific for
Rochow, was there?

A.

Not specifically to Mr. Rochow, no.

Tr. ofNov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 93.
The Court therefore finds that Defendant may
not discount its profits for retained income.

Net Income
Defendant next argues that after the gross
amount of incremental investment is determined,
"specific adjustments" are made to determine the
amount Defendant actually retained. Defendant uses
the metric of "net income" to determine its investment return, saying that this is "the standard metric
used to measure profitability within the insurance
industry." Def.'s Br. at 9. While not identifying what
"specific adjustments" being referred to, Defendant's
argument seems to be that it should be permitted to
deduct the costs of running its investment portfolio
from profits gained by the use of Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld benefits. This seems to be against the
spirit of restitution, as Defendant is essentially
reimbursing itself for the administrative costs of
using Plaintiff's money to make a profit. As noted in
Nickel, supra, "if you take my money and make
money with it, your profit belongs to me." 290 F.3d at
1138. The Court finds that Plaintiff should not be
required to compensate Defendant for the costs of
administering Plaintiff's wrongfully withheld benefits.
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The Court therefore finds that Defendant may
not offset its profits to reflect a "net income" measurement.

Direct Interest Crediting
Defendant applies a 50% slash in the "rate of
investment return" because it states that said
amount is "returned to policyholders via direct interest crediting to the policyholders' benefit or indirectly
as policy reserves increase due to the passage of
time." While it is unclear how this amount would
apply in comparison with overall profits, Defendant
has again failed to demonstrate that this investment
return actually applies to the benefit payments
withheld from Plaintiff. The following exchange took
place between Defendant's counsel and Defendant's
expert Timothy Holzli:
Q. Would you stop there and please explain
to the Court who this crediting involves or
what it involves.

A. There are three specific circumstances
where LINA credits investment income. The
first of those is for group universal life contracts, which is a combination of a life insurance policy and an investment policy. Under
those policies, the beneficiaries have a side
account which is credited with a stated interest as per their policy documents.
Q. Other than the first adjustment, what
did you do next?
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A. The second adjustment refers to certain
experience rated contracts. LINA has certain
contracts with employer groups that pass the
claims experience of that group back to the
policyholder. So, to the extent that that policy - that employer group has favorable
claims experience, LINA establishes a liability payable back to that employer group. On
that liability, LINA again credits interest to
that employer group based on a stated contractual rate.
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 35-36 (the third "credit" is
the "discount for retained income").
A. [F]ifty percent represents the investment income that is, in fact, credited back to
contract holders and policyholders.

Q. By the way, that 50 percent figure, is
that a number that you just picked out of the
air?
A. It is not. It's based on an internal analysis that we monitor. And over the years in
question, it ranged between 45 and 55 percent.
Tr. of Nov. 4, 2011 Hr'g at 56.
While the Court credits Defendant's expert's
statements that these credits do exist, Defendant has
provided no evidence that the profits derived from the
improper withholding of Plaintiff's benefits were or
were not used for the purpose of refunding these
credits. Nor is Plaintiff responsible for satisfying
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payments due because of Defendant's · contractual
agreements with third parties.
As such, the Court therefore finds that Defendant may not offset its profits by "direct interest
crediting."

Deduction of Taxes
Defendant argues that the "statutory rate" on its
income is 35%. Defendant argues, based on In Design
v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d
Cir.1994), that they may deduct income taxes from
restitution, but fails to note that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals only permitted said deduction when
the wrongful act leading to the unjust enrichment
was not "willful and deliberate." There is a long line
of cases running against Defendant that hold that
taxes cannot be offset from restitution payments
where a Defendant deliberately engaged in a wrongful act. See, e.g., Do nell v. Kowell, 533 F. 3d 762, 778
(9th Cir.2008) (investor in Ponzi scheme could not
offset unjust enrichment by amount of taxes); SEC v.
Razmilovic, 2011 WL 4629022, at *31 (E.D.N.Y.2011)
(no offset for income taxes in insider trading case);
SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F.Supp.2d 331, 345
(S.D.N.Y.2006) (no deduction for capital gains taxes
in securities fraud).
The Court finds that Defendant's underlying
actions in this case in refusing to grant Plaintiff
benefits qualify as "deliberate and willful" wrongful
acts. The Court has already ruled that Defendant
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acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in its
Order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff [12],
and the Sixth Circuit has affirmed this ruling.
Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482 F.3d 860 (6th
Cir.2007). In addition, in the Order [67] requiring
disgorgement and an equitable accounting, this Court
found that Defendant, in denying Plaintiff disability
benefits, created "non-existent [insurance] policy
requirements," concocted a "[k]nowingly false rationale for [the] second denial" of benefits, and closed
the administrative record without medical input or
evidence. This Court also found that Defendant had
acted in bad faith. The Court finds that Defendants
therefore acted in a "deliberate and willful" manner
in carrying out the underlying wrongful act, the
denial of benefits. Therefore, Defendant will not be
permitted to deduct taxes from the disgorgement of
their unjust enrichment.
Realized versus Unrealized Gains

Plaintiff argues that "unrealized gains" should be
taken into account in determining Defendant's profit.
Essentially, unrealized gains are gains in investments
that Defendant has not yet "cashed in" or sold, but
that have increased in value. Defendant argues that
said gains are "paper gains" on investment that could

decrease in value later, and thus it would be unfair to
provide Plaintiff with a share of profits on investments that Defendant has not yet realized.
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The circuits are divided on this question, and
there is little clear caselaw. In Ivan Allen Co. v.
United States, 493 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1974), the court,
in valuing securities for purposes of determining
whether a corporation had unreasonably accumulated
profits, set the value of the securities not at their
original cost but at their fair market-value minus cost
to realize said value. The court recognized that it was
necessary, in considering profits, to look at the present fair-market value of an investment, particularly
given the fact that the investments were easy to
translate into liquid cash. The same rule applies in
estate tax cases, where tax is assessed at the time of
decedent's death, and investment value is based on
fair-market value at time of death. See Gump v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 124 F.2d 540, 543 (9th
Cir.1941). Thus, both cases seem to support Plaintiff's position that unrealized gains in value should be
taken into account in determining profit, as they
suggest that this Court should look at the "present
value" of Defendant's assets, regardless of whether
the gains are realized or unrealized.
On the other hand, in C.I.R. v. Godley's Estate,
213 F.2d 529, 532 (3d Cir.1954), the court, in attempting to define "dividends" as "a corporate distribution
to its shareholders out of its earnings or profits,"
defined "profits," and found that "unrealized gains
should not increase earnings or profits." This supports Defendant's position.
The Court finds that this situation is more similar to levying an estate tax or other tax where a
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snapshot of fair-market value is necessary. Defendant
has not and apparently cannot demonstrate that
Plaintiff's withheld benefits were segregated into a
fund from which it derived only realized gains. As the
burden is on the Defendant to establish which profits
flowed from its unjust enrichment, the Court must
assume that Plaintiff's funds were used in both
realized and unrealized investments. Defendant
should not be able to reap a windfall in unrealized
investments from the use of Plaintiff's funds down
the road merely because Defendant has not yet
chosen to cash in on those investments; Defendant
will likely realize eventual profit from the day-to-day
increase in value of those investments purchased in
whole or in part through the fruit of its unjust enrichment. While it is, of course, possible that said
investments may decline in value over time, uncertainty in this issue should be resolved against the
tortfeasor, in this case the Defendant.
The Court therefore finds that Defendant's
profits must include unrealized gains.

III. Conclusion
In summary, the Court finds that the Defendant
has the burden of proof in demonstrating that its
accounting is correct, and that uncertainty in accounting is resolved against Defendant. The Court
finds that Defendant has failed to establish that the
benefits wrongfully withheld from Plaintiff were
segregated in a fund that limited profit to "investment
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income," and thus the Court adopts Plaintiff's method of determining the extent of Defendant's profits
during the relevant period. The Court also rejects the
various offsets proposed by Defendant.

RELIEF
Plaintiff will, within two weeks from this order,
submit a final amount to be disgorged by Defendant
based upon the Court's rulings, above. Defendant
may then submit a memorandum in response within
seven days. This memorandum is limited only to any
objections regarding the accuracy of Plaintiff's calculations based on this order, and is not an invitation to
relitigate issues already decided by this Court.

SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PATRICK RocHOW, Personal
Representative of the
Estate of DANIEL J. ROCHOW,
Civil Case No.
04-73628

Plaintiff,

v.

Honorable
Arthur J. Tarnow

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant.

I

-----------------------

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [46] FOR EQUITABLE
ACCOUNTING; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [46] FOR ATTORNEY FEES;
ANn DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION [60] TO STRIKE
(Filed Jun. 16, 2009)
Before the court are plaintiff's motions for equitable accounting and for attorney fees. These matters
came on for a hearing on February 27, 2009. Also
before the court are updated reports from plaintiff's
expert, along with defendant's responses, as well as
plaintiff's motion to strike the affidavit attached to
one of defendant's response briefs.
This court and the Sixth Circuit have already
concluded that defendant Life Insurance Company
of North America (LINA) acted arbitrarily or capri- .
ciously when it denied plaintiffs claim for disability
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benefits. Rockow v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 482
F.3d 860 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Daniel Rochow,
now deceased, is entitled to benefits, payable to his
estate.
The controversy between the parties concerns the
kind of remedy available to plaintiff, as well as the
calculation of the benefit. There are four main areas
of contention. First, is Rochow entitled to the remedy
of disgorgement? Such a remedy would disgorge from
LINA any gain that defendant had accrued while it
had custody over money that it withheld from Rochow
in breach of its fiduciary duty to him. The short
answer is that the catchall provision of ERISA, 29
U.S. C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), recognizes plaintiff's entitle-.
ment to this remedy.
Second, the covered-earnings issue: what are
Rochow's base earnings, from which his benefit is
calculated? The court determines that plaintiff's
entire actual earnings in the year prior to the onset of
his disability, even those earnings that did not come
from Rochow's employer, count as plaintiff's "covered
earnings" under the plan.
Third, is the disability benefit subject to an
automatic cost-of-living increase? No: the policy does
not require cost-of-living adjustments, and there is no
authority to support plaintiff's proposition that the
failure of an insurer to inflation-index benefits is per
se unconscionable.
Fourth, should attorney fees be award to plaintiff, and if so, is a 50% enhancement of the award
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warranted? The court will award attorney fees but
will only enhance the award by 20%.
I.

Disgorgement
A. Does equitable accounting control this inquiry?

Plaintiff urges the court to apply the remedy of
equitable accounting. Equitable accounting, according
to Rochow, is required when a fiduciary breaches its
duty. The court must then examine and adjust the
accounts between the parties. Furthermore, at oral
argument, plaintiff insisted that the remedy of equitable accounting subsumes the three areas of dispute,
apart from the issue of attorney fees. In other words,
the court's resolution of what income counts as "covered earnings" under the plan, of whether the benefit
is indexed according to inflation, and of whether
LINNs profits on the withheld benefits should be
disgorged, the resolution of these issues would all be
components of the remedy of equitable accounting.
The court is not persuaded by this theory. Rather,
the statutory language in ERISA guides the award of
benefits to Rochow. It is unnecessary to superimpose
plaintiff's version of equitable accounting onto the
structure that Congress has already established.
Accordingly, the covered-earnings issue and the
dispute over inflation-indexing are simply determinations that the court must make in order to calculate
the benefits. due to Rochow under the terms of his
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B). Cognizant of this
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statutory structure, equitable accounting is extraneous to the resolution of these two issues.
B. The basis for disgorgement
Likewise, the statute guides the court's analysis
of whether the remedy of disgorgement is available.
The benefits-recovery provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), allows a plan participant to recover
"benefits due to him." Profits unjustly accrued by
LINA do not easily fit within this provision's requirement that "benefits" are what are recoverable
under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Nor does the court choose to
rely on the suggestion that disgorgement is recognized as relief incidental to the recovery of benefits.
See, e.g., 1A C.J.S. Accounting § 10 (2009) ("Equity
frequently takes jurisdiction of an accounting ... as
incidental to some other relief within the jurisdiction
of equity, as in the case of fiduciary relations"); Peck
v. Ayers & Lord Tie Co., 116 F. 273, 275 (6th Cir.
1902) (articulating principle that accounting is incidental relief to primary claim for breach of fiduciary's
duty to prevent waste of a property); Adams v.
Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004)
("An accounting is a form of equitable relief incidental
to a substantive claim."). Even if other courts may
have recognized disgorgement as incidental relief
under the benefits-recovery provision, sturdier ground
for disgorgement lies elsewhere.
Plaintiff offers two other bases for disgorgement:
the inherent equitable power of the court and 29
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U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), the catchall proVIsiOn. See,
e.g., Rybarczyk v. TRW, Inc., 235 F.3d 975, 986 (6th
Cir. 2000) (in ERISA case, court set pre-judgment
interest at the rate of defendant's earnings, meaning
that statutory interest rate was not the court's only
option and that setting pre-judgment interest rate at
actual rate of return avoids unjust enrichment). The
court declines to rely upon its inherent authority
where Congress has otherwise expressly empowered
the court to disgorge LINA's profits through the
remedy of an accounting for profits. See Parke v. First
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F. 3d 999, 1008
(in benefits-denial case, court stated that "[i]t is
undisputed that an accounting for profits- the remedy that allows for the disgorgement of profits awarded by the district court - is a type of relief that was
typically available in equity and therefore is_ appropriate under § 1132(a)(3)(B)"). The catchall provision
allows a plan participant to "obtain other appropriate
equitable relief" to "redress ... violations" of the plan
or ERISA. Disgorgement through an accounting for
profits is appropriate equitable relief.
C. The catchall provision
In a nutshell, LINA argues that plaintiff's lawsuit is necessarily a benefits-recovery suit controlled
by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Though plaintiff has

invoked both the benefits-recovery and catchall
provisions, defendant maintains that a plaintiff
cannot plead both claims, under Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). The court acknowledges
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that benefits cannot be recovered under the catchall
provision, and that the catchall provision is only
available to those who cannot avail of other remedies
afforded by ERISA. But this is not fatal to plaintiff's
request for disgorgement through an accounting for
profits. Furthermore, the court rejects LIN~s argument that there has been no finding of a breach of
fiduciary duty, which is required to trigger the availability of equitable relief under the catchall provision.
As Varity explains, an arbitrary or capricious denial
of benefits can count as a breach of fiduciary duty. I d.
at 514-15. Furthermore, disgorgement, cognized
under the catchall provision, is not an attempt to
avoid the limitations of the benefits-recovery provision, because disgorgement seeks a different kind of · ·
relief than simply recovering benefits. Disgorgement
through an accounting does not seek to compensate
plaintiff for his injury or for the time-value of the
withheld benefits. Rather, disgorgement remedies the
unfairness of unjust enrichment. Therefore, disgorgement is available under the catchall provision
as "other appropriate equitable relief," even when a
plaintiff has recovered benefits. The court will now
expand upon this summary.
In Varity, the Supreme Court explained that the
catchall provision provides equitable relief for "injuries caused by violations that § 502 [of ERISA] does
not elsewhere adequately remedy." Varity, supra, 516
U.S. at 512. LINA asserts that plaintiff's lawsuit is
about recovering benefits due to him and that a
catchall-provision claim is not relevant or cannot be
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maintained. But plaintiff has pleaded for relief under
both the benefits-recovery and catchall provisions.
And the Sixth Circuit has recognized that under some
circumstances a plaintiff may maintain catchall and
benefits-recovery claims simultaneously. Gore v. El
Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability, 477 F. 3d
833, 839 (6th Cir. 2007).
Defendant also suggests that there has been no
fmding of a breach of fiduciary duty that would count
as a "violation" of the plan or ERISA, under the
catchall provision. But Varity explains that a denial of
benefits can be a breach of fiduciary duty. See Varity,
supra, 516 U.S. at 514-15 ("characterizing a denial of
benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty'' does not
change the standard a court would apply when reviewing an administrator's decision to deny benefits,
meaning that a catchall-provision claim related to the
denial of benefits is not necessarily a repackaged
benefits-recovery claim). In this instance, LINA's
denial of benefits to Rochow was arbitrary or capricious. Surely, arbitrary or capricious action by a
fiduciary is a breach of the high standards that the
law imposes on fiduciaries. Accordingly, a denial of
benefits can count as a violation that would trigger
liability under the catchall provision.
The best argument that defendant can make is

that disgorgement is not "appropriate" relief, even if a
catchall claim could be simultaneously cognizable
with a benefits-recovery claim. See Varity, supra, 516
U.S. at 515 (courts should expect that "where Congress has elsewhere provided adequate relief for a
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beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for
further equitable relief, in which case such relief
normally would not be 'appropriate'"). But Rochow
asks for a different kind of relief that does not merely
duplicate the benefits that he is already entitled to
recover. In other words, plaintiff's request for disgorgement under the catchall provision is "appropriate," because his claim is not merely a repackaged
benefits-recovery claim, disguising itself as a catchall
claim in order to circumvent the procedural strictures
-judgment on an administrative record and deferential review, for instance - of the benefits-recovery
prOVISIOn.
The reason why, in Rochow's case, there is a
"need for further equitable relief" under the catchall
provision is this: disgorgement through an accounting
offers a remedy distinct from the relief offered
through the benefits-recovery provision. Disgorgement is not the same thing as compensating plaintiff
for the time value of benefits that LINA has arbitrarily withheld. Disgorgement looks at the breaching
fiduciary's unjust enrichment, rather than the beneficiary's loss or entitlement. And because disgorgement
is distinct from simply recovering benefits due to a
plan participant, plaintiff can invoke the catchall
provision as a basis for requesting disgorgement,
given that the benefits-recovery provision does not
plainly recognize the availability of disgorgement.
Therefore, any gain that LINA accrued from the
money it withheld from Rochow will .be disgorged.
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The court will set an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount, if any, of this unjust enrichment.
II.

Covered earnings

The parties dispute the amount of Rochow's base
earnings, from which his benefit is calculated. The
relevant language in the policy says that "Basic
Monthly Earnings," related to "Covered Earnings,"
will be the greater of "your current monthly base
salary or 1/12 of your prior year base earnings, overtime, and eligible bonus as determined at the time of
disability. Covered Earnings are determined initially
on the date an Employee applies for coverage."
Both sides agree that the "your monthly base
salary" route of calculating covered earnings does not
apply. Rather, the benefit is determined in Rochow's
case by looking at prior-year earnings and dividing by
12. Both sides also agree that the "prior year" under
this second route to calculate covered earnings is the
year 2000, as this court and the Sixth Circuit determined that Rochow became disabled in 2001.
Rochow believes that his covered earnings 1n

2000 should be calculated by looking at his actual
earnings from the entire year. He earned $269,000.
LINA, on the contrary, wants to calculate
Rochow's benefits by looking only at the salary attributable to Gallagher, Rochow's employer, because
the policy was issued to Gallagher. This would mean
only counting the earnings attributable to the
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Gallagher salary from June to December 2000, and
then extrapolating from those earnings to arrive at a
prior-year income of $150,000.
LINA's contention must be rejected. There is no
language in the policy that requires prior-year earnings to only come from the policyholder. Defendant's
secondary argument is that some of Rochow's nonGallagher income came from Rochow's sale of
Universico to Gallagher. Rochow denies that this is
the case and submitted a supporting declaration.
LINA has not come forward with any evidence to the
contrary. Therefore, the court credits Rochow's representation that the $269,000 in covered earnings does
not include money proceeding from the sale of
Universico.
III. Cost-of-living increase
The court must decide whether the disability
benefit is subject to an automatic cost-of-living increase. Here, the court rejects Rochow's assertions.
Nothing in the policy requires cost-of-living adjustments to the benefit in Rochow's situation. Plaintiff
cites the definition of "Indexed Covered Earnings" as
support for the proposition that Rochow's benefits
increase with inflation. But as LINA explains, In-

dexed Covered Earnings are only a basis for calculating the disability benefit when the "Work Incentive
Benefit Calculation" is employed. And the Work

Incentive Benefit Calculation only comes into play if
the plan participant is "working while disabled." That
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is clearly not the case in Rochow's situation, at least
for the majority of the time for which the disability
benefit must be calculated. Therefore, the Disability
Benefit Calculation is denoted by the "schedule of
benefits," which does not include any language about
inflation indexing. The schedule of benefits merely
states that the monthly benefit is based on the "Gross
Disability Benefit," which is defined in relevant part
as "60% of your monthly Covered Earnings." The
definition of Gross Disability Benefit could have been
based on Indexed Covered Earnings, but the text only
refers to Covered Earnings. The plan reflects a distinction between Covered Earnings and Indexed
Covered Earnings. Accordingly, the plan language
does not support plaintiff's position.
Nor is the court persuaded by plaintiff's assertion that it is per se unconscionable for an insurance
company to issue a policy whose benefit is not indexed for inflation. There is no authority for plaintiff's argument.
IV.

Attorney fees and enhancement

ERISA allows the court to award attorney fees
and costs. Under Secretary of Dept. of Labor v. King,
775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985), there are five factors
that flexibly guide the court:
•

the degree of the opposing party's culpability
or bad faith

•

the opposing party's ability to satisfy an
award of attorney's fees

llla

•

the deterrent effect of an award on other
persons under similar circumstances

•

whether the party requesting fees sought to
confer a common benefit on all participants
and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve
significant legal questions regarding ERISA
and

•

the relative merits of the parties positions .

The court will award attorney fees as well as a
20%

enh,ance~ent.

A. Bad faith
Rochow notes that it is the norm for a court to
deem a defendant culpable when that defendant has
denied benefits arbitrarily and capriciously. Furthermore, plaintiff cites defendant's invocation of nonexistent policy requirements, LINA's knowingly false
rationale for the denial of Rochow's second appeal,
defendant's closing of the administrative record
without medical input or evidence, and LINA's inconsistency.
1. Non-existent policy requirements
Rochow says that LINA acted in bad faith when
it initially denied his claim for benefits. Specifically,
LINA - though conceding that Rochow experienced
symptoms of encephalitis throughout 2001 -

had

decided that Rochow could not be considered disabled
because he continued to work in 2001. Plaintiff calls
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this the "walking wounded" defense. Plaintiff is right:
there was nothing in the policy that said that working in a job would prevent a beneficiary from being
considered disabled, even if a beneficiary would
otherwise be considered disabled due to an inability
to perform the material duties of one's regular occupation.
Likewise, Rochow is correct that there was no
policy language requiring plaintiff to submit "medical
evidence" to demonstrate his disability. The policy
only required "satisfactory proof" Nevertheless, LINA
persevered in trying to apply a standard that was
foreign to the policy language.
2. Knowingly false rationale for second
denial
Rochow explains that LINA's rationale for the
denial of his second appeal was that he had filed his
claim too late, as the claim was filed after Rochow's
termination date.
However, nothing in the policy said that the
claim was too late. Moreover, Rochow argues that
LINA knew that such a rationale was false. Plaintiff
points to an internal note handwritten by someone in
LINA that said, "claim submitted late by [Rochow]
but not more than one year late." LINA does not
dispute this in its brief.
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3. Closing the administrative record without medical input or evidence
Rochow maintains that LINA waited until the
last administrative appeal to rely on a new rationale
for denying plaintiff's claim. The new rationale was
the lack of medical evidence. Although Rochow argued before the courts that medical evidence was not
required under the policy, Rochow's point still stands.
Plaintiff contends that LINA showed bad faith by
waiting until the last administrative appeal to rely on
this new rationale, which left plaintiff without any
means to supplement the administrative record to
include medical evidence that could have persuaded
LINA.
LINA reminds the court that Rochow was challenging the need to provide medical evidence, suggesting that plaintiff cannot now say that LINA
should have required medical evidence up front. The
court rejects defendant's position.
Rochow also observes that LINA did not seek
expert evaluations of the evidence that plaintiff did
submit, considering the rarity of the herpes encephalitis that afflicted Rochow. This goes to the arbitrary
and capricious nature of LINA's decision and also to
LINA's bad faith.
4. Inconsistency
Several times Rochow asserts that inconsistency
itself shows bad faith. In other words, if an insurer
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keeps changing its reason for a denial, that demonstrates bad faith. The court need not reach this
argument, because there are plenty of other reasons
why LINA acted culpably.
B. Common benefit
Under the second King factor, Rochow contends
that his case conferred a common benefit by resolving
significant legal questions surrounding ERISA
Rochow notes that the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Rockow has been cited over 30 times already, even
though it's only two years old. Courts have discussed
the rejection of insurance companies' "walking
wounded" defense; the sufficiency of non-medical
evidence to show "satisfactory proof" of disability;
and the possibility that disability is present before a
claim is filed and that retrospective diagnosis can
establish this.
The court agrees with Rochow.
C. Relative Merits
It is clear that Rochow's victory, despite the
arbitrary-or-capricious standard, shows that his
position had more merit than LINA's. The question is
whether plaintiff's victory was overwhelming.
Rochow does not expand on this point much.

LINA cites this court's bench ruling, where the
court stated "I agree with you; the letter is not - from
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Dr. Forman is not overwhelming. But when you put it
in the context of his job ... I think the Plaintiff has
prevailed." .
In view of the arguments that Rochow makes to
support a finding of bad faith, Rochow did win his
claim for recovery of benefits overwhelmingly. LINA
did not have serious arguments based in the policy
language to support its position.
The other King factors - LIN.Ns ability to pay
and the deterrent effect of attorney fees are selfevident.
D. Hours and rates
Rochow wants nearly $194,000 in attorney fees.
This figure does not account for interest that accrued
from the times that the various fees were incurred.
LINA balks at the number of hours that Rochow's
counsel worked on this case. While Rochow's trial
attorney only worked 43 hours during the districtcourt proceedings, appellate and trial counsel present
a bill for 608 hours on appeal. LINA suggests that
this does not make sense, particularly considering
that LIN.Ns fees were only 1/3 of what plaintiff now
seeks.
Rochow explains that much of the work at the
district-court level built on work that plaintiff's
counsel did during the administrative appeals. So
much time was spent on appeal because Rochow
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needed to defend a bench ruling before a Sixth Circuit
panel.
LINA also asserts that some of the hours on
appeal resulted from unsuccessful motions that were
a waste of time. Rochow notes that LINA does not
point out which motions were unsuccessful and why.
Plaintiff explains why he needed to file these motions
on appeal. The court finds these explanations reasonable.
LINA also maintains that hourly rates are excessive: $225 for trial counsel and $335 for appellate
counsel. The court disagrees.
E. Enhancement
Rochow also asks for a 50% enhancement of the
attorney-fee award. Deciding whether to award an
enhancement is guided by 12 factors announced by
the Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
U.S. 87, 93 (1989). See also Murphy v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1313, 1314-15 (11th
Cir. 2001) (ERISA attorney-fee statute similar to
other federal attorney-fee statutes, which were at
issue in Blanchard). These factors are
•

the time and labor required

•

the novelty and difficulty of the questions

•

the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly
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•

the preclusion of other employment by the
Aattorney due to acceptance of the case

•
•
•

the customary fee
whether the fee is fixed or contingent
time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances

•

the amount involved and the results obtained

•

the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys

•
•

the "undesirability" of the case

•

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client
awards in similar cases

The fact that a case is taken on a contingent-fee
arrangement cannot be the basis for an enhancement.
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992).
Rochow highlights the novelty and difficulty of
the case, the skill needed, the preclusion of other
employment, the results achieved, and the undesirability of the case. The undesirability of the case is
demonstrated not only by the fact that this is an
ERISA claim facing the usual substantial procedural
obstacles, but that Rochow's first attorney encouraged
Rochow to give up in the face of LINA's arguments.
Trial counsel attaches a letter saying so. Plaintiff's
counsel also present a declaration from an appellate
expert, Nancy Wear, who read the papers in this case,
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listened to oral argument, and reviewed counsel's
billing request, which she supports.
Whether to award an enhancement Is In the
court's discretion, and the court believes some enhancement is warranted. Rochow asks for 50%. He
presents a Sixth Circuit case, Paschal v. Flagstar
Bank, 297 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2002), where a 50%
enhancement was affirmed. Instead, the court will
award an enhancement of 20%.
V.

Plaintiff's motion to strike affidavit

Shortly before oral argument on the motions for
equitable accounting and for attorney fees, plaintiff
moved to strike an affidavit that LINA had attached
to one of its briefs. The parties have continued to brief
the issue of LINA's profits. Therefore, plaintiff's
motion is DENIED.
VI. Conclusion
The court grants the remedy of an accounting for
profits. Any profits that LINA accrued on the benefits
withheld from Rochow will be disgorged. The parties
have briefed the issue of LINA's rate of return, so the
court will set an evidentiary hearing.
The motions for equitable accounting and for
attomey fees are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
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SO ORDERED.
S/ARTHUR J. TARNOW
Arthur J. Tarnow
United States District Judge
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OPINION
OBERDORFER, District Judge.
Daniel Rochow, the former President of Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co. ("Gallagher"), currently suffers from

* The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District
Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
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HSV-Encephalitis, a rare and severely debilitating
disease. ,The question in this case is whether or not
the insurer, Life Insurance Company of North America ("LINA") acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it
concluded that Rochow was not disabled on the date
that he left his job, therefore denying his claim for
disability benefits. The district court held that LINA's
determination was arbitrary and capricious and
unsupported by the administrative record. For the
reasons hereinafter stated, we AFFIRM that decision.

BACKGROUND
A. Rochow's Symptoms and Diagnosis
The Administrative Record reveals the following
facts. Daniel Rochow was the President of Gallagher
for ten years. He had long-term disability coverage
through Gallagher's Group Insurance Plan (the
"Plan"), administered by LINA. In 2001, Rochow
began to experience short-term memory loss, occasional chills, sporadic sweating, and stress at work.
On June 15, 2001, he visited Dr. Bruce Forman to
discuss his symptoms. Dr. Forman took notes, but did
not record any conclusions.
In July 2001, Gallagher demoted Rochow from
President to Sales Executive - Account Manager.
According to Jack Tellerico, an Area Vice President
and Rochow's co-worker at Gallagher, this demotion
occurred because Rochow could no longer perform his
duties as President.
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On August 21, 2001, Rochow returned to Dr.
Forman. He reiterated his concerns about his shortterm memory loss, which had now been ongoing for
six to eight months. Dr. Forman again took notes
regarding Rochow's complaints. He concluded that
Rochow was suffering from depression, prescribed
anti-depressants, and referred him to a neurologist.
[JA 131].
On October 2, 2001, Rochow saw a neurologist,
Dr. Mary Ann McKee. According to Dr. McKee's notes,
during the examination, Rochow was at times unable
to answer her questions or describe his problems. He
was tearful and cried often during the exam. He told
Dr. McKee that the reason for his visit was "distractibility and difficult[sic] with memory." [JA 153]. He
explained that "for the last six months he has noticed
that he might think of something and then in the
middle of his thoughts he will lose the rest of the
thought and not be able to complete the sentence."
[JA 153]. Dr. McKee concluded that ''his memory
difficulty is really secondary to depression and does
not represent an organic brain disorder." [JA 154]. An
MRI on October 9, 2001 was. "unremarkable." [JA
156].
During this time, Rochow was having increasing
difficulties at work. According to Tellerico, Rochow
became unable to perform duties as a Sales ExecutiveAccount Manager, which included budgeting revenue,
developing sales plans, and identifying new clients or
new products for existing clients; "[s]ince Mr. Rochow
could not perform these material duties, he was not
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able to continue working at Arthur J. Gallagher &
Co." [JA 113]. January 2, 2002 was his last day of
employment, and the day on which his disability
coverage with LINA lapsed.
In February 2002, Rochow visited his son in
Sarasota, Florida. On the evening of February 17,
security guards discovered Rochow wandering alone
in a parking lot, unable to explain why he was there.
His speech was slurred, and he exhibited amnestic
symptoms. The Sarasota Fire Department transported him to the emergency room at Sarasota Memorial
hospital. There, Rochow believed he was in Michigan
and continued to exhibit amnestic symptoms. A
radiologic scan was again "unremarkable." [JA 415].
He was involuntarily civilly committed at a psychiatric hospital.
On February 20, 2002, Rochow was brought back
to the emergency room because of a "sudden change
and altered mental status." [JA 223]. The emergency
room staff conducted a lumbar puncture. An infectious disease specialist and a neurologist diagnosed
Rochow with HSV-Encephalitis. HSV-Encephalitis is
an extremely rare form of herpes that can cause
"brain trauma not unlike the sort associated with
strokes, car accidents, or gunshot wounds." In re
Myrick, 624 A.2d 1222, 1224 (D.C.Ct.App.1993). He
was prescribed long-term anti-viral medications. On
February 25, 2002, a physician attempted to interview Rochow; he was still unable to provide helpful
information. Based on discussions with Rochow's exwife and a colleague, this physician concluded that
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"[t]he patient's history fits better with a more slow
onset process." [JA 262].
On March 5, 2002, Rochow was transferred by
medical helicopter to Henry Ford Hospital in Michigan for continued treatment. He was discharged on
March 14, 2002 with a recommendation for assisted
living or 24-hour supervision at home, and with the
sad prognosis that "he may never fully recover or be
able to function on his own." [JA 467].

B. The Claims Process
In late December 2002, Rochow, through his
personal representative, filed a claim for disability
benefits pursuant to LINA's insurance plan. The plan
provided in relevant part as follows:

WHEN COVERAGE ENDS
Your coverage ends on the earliest of the following dates:
... the day you are no longer in Active SerVIce.

***
DESCRIPTION OF BENEFITS
WHAT IS COVERED

Disability Benefits
We will pay Disability Benefits if you become
Disabled while covered under this Policy. You
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must satisfy the Elimination Period, be under the Appropriate Care of a Physician, and
meet all the other terms and conditions of
the Policy. You must provide to us, at your
own expense, satisfactory proof of Disability
before benefits will be paid.

***
DEFINITIONS
Active Service
If you are an Employee, you are in Active Service on a day which is one of
your Employer's scheduled work days if
either of the following conditions are
met.
1.

You are actively at work. This
means you are performing your regular occupation for the Employer on
a Full-time basis, either at one of
the Employer's usual places of business or at some location to which
the Employer's business requires
you to travel.

2.

The day is a scheduled holiday, vacation day or period of Employer
approved paid leave of absence.

You are in Active Service on a day which

is not one of the Employer's scheduled
work days only if you were in Active
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Service on the preceding scheduled work
day....

Disability
You are considered Disabled if, solely because of Injury or Sickness, you are ...
unable to perform all the material duties
of your Regular Occupation or a Qualified Alternative[.]
[JA27-37].
Rochow's initial claim form incorrectly stated
that he was still employed at the time of his medical
crisis in February 2002. LINA issued its first denial
letter on January 27, 2003, concluding that Rochow's
actual employment terminated on January 2, 2002.
Rochow, now represented by counsel, responded that
his employment had indeed terminated on January 2,
2002, but that he had been disabled and suffered the
effects of his condition throughout 2001.
LINA issued a second denial on April 3, 2003. It
acknowledged Rochow's disease and symptoms but
still concluded that Rochow was not disabled until his
acute medical crisis:
"[l]t is evident that Mr. Rochow experienced the affects [sic] of encephalitis throughout the calendar year

of 2001[.] ... According to the medical records, Mr. Rochow has experienced the symptoms of depressive
disorders continuously while working in 2001. Because he continued to
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work, he cannot be considered disabled based on the policy's definition
of disability. It appears his inability
to function did not occur until February 18, 2002."
[JA 121-22].
Rochow again challenged the denial. He submitted a letter from Dr. Forman, dated September 28,
2003, stating: "it is my opinion that Mr. Rochow had
memory problems that would have affected his ability
to perform tasks as an Insurance Salesman in 2001."
[JA 112]. On December 22, 2003, LINA issued a third
denial suggesting that his claim was being denied for
general lack of documentation. Finally, on July 16,
2004, at the end of the administrative appeals process, LINA denied his claim for lack of medical evidence.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rochow's challenge of LINA's determination in
the Eastern District of Michigan involves the Employee Retirement Income Security Act· of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. The district court
ruled from the bench that LINA's determination that
Rochow was not disabled on January 2, 2002 was
arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the
administrative record. In the context of the record as
a whole, the district court found that "the February

17th [2002] incident [was] corroborative evidence of a
pre-existing disability."
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Specifically, the district court reasoned as follows:
[T]he fact that he was able to work is certainly evidence for the Defense. However,
when we have Mr. Tellerico saying he was on
the payroll, but he wasn't able to do the work
that he had been doing before, and we have
such a severe loss of memory, compounded by
the depression, and it is clear that that
memory loss - it seems to be clear that that
memory loss may have contributed to his being demoted before he claimed disability, I
think he has prevailed.
And certainly the Defense is right; that the
Plaintiff has the burden of proof initially as
to disability and has a much heavier burden
of proof, when he comes to this court, to show
not only disability, but that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious.
The fact that he was collecting pay, I don't
think is relevant. You've got a person who is
the head of the agency, Arthur Gallagher &
Company. . . . [T]he letter is not - from Dr.
Forman is not overwhelming. But when you
put it in the context of his job, career - his
career path, which was downhill, and the
lack of any medical evidence presented in
support of finding him not disabled, I think
the Plaintiff has prevailed.

[JA 552-54]. Defendant timely appealed.
The primary issue before us is whether Rochow
presented sufficient evidence to establish that he was
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disabled within the meaning of the Plan before or on
January 2, 2002.

DISCUSSION
Rochow's claim is governed by ERISA. ERISA
provides that insurance companies "shall discharge
[their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and []
for the exclusive purpose of [] providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries ... in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of this subchapter ... "
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
We "review de novo the decision of a district court
granting judgment in an ERISA disability benefit
action based on an administrative record." Glenn v.
MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006) (citing
Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F. 3d 609,
613 (6th Cir.1998)), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W.
3368 (U.S. Jan. 3, 2007) (No.06-92).
Where, as here, an insurance plan administrator
is vested with discretion to interpret the plan, we
review the denial of benefits under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103
L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Evans v. Unumprovident Corp.,
434 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir.2006). This standard
requires "review of the quality and quantity of the
medical evidence and the opinions on both sides of
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the issues." McDonald v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d
161, 172 (6th Cir.2003). In conducting our review, we
are limited to consideration of the pre-packaged
administrative record. See Moon v. Unum Provident
Corp., 405 F. 3d 373, 378 (6th Cir.2005). A decision
should be upheld if it is "the result of a deliberate
principled reasoning process" and "supported by
substantial evidence." Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health &
Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir.1991)).
We conclude that the record before us supports
the district court's decision that the Plan Administrator's denial of Rochow's claims was arbitrary and
capricious. The fact that Rochow remained on the
payroll until January 2, 2002 is not determinative as
to whether or not he was disabled during that time;
there is no "logical incompatibility between working
full time and being disabled from working full time."
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability
Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir.2003). Tellerico
states that Rochow was demoted, and ultimately
terminated, because he could no longer perform the
duties required of his position. Rochow does not have
to prove that he was disabled in 2001 due to HSVEncephalitis; only that in 2001 he was unable to
perform his duties due to injury or sickness. Furthermore, the policy does not require medical evidence, only "satisfactory proof."
The medical evidence in the record is inconclusive as to the reasons for Rochow's 2001 symptoms,
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although we note that LINA's April 3, 2003 denial
letter conceded that he was suffering from those
symptoms throughout 2001. Contemporaneous medical notes document Rochow's cognitive deterioration.
Competing evidence in the record showing that his
2001 symptoms were not disabling is conspicuously
absent. The ultimate tragic incident in Sarasota and
its extended onset and sequelae, Dr. Foreman's
retrospective letter, Tellerico's account of Rochow's
duties and his inability to perform them, and the
entire record, viewed in perspective, confirm the
district court's ruling that LINA's denial of benefits
was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by
substantial evidence. Killian, 152 F.3d at 520. LINA's
determination was not the result of a deliberate,
principled reasoning process. I d.; Glenn, 461 F. 3d at
666. Nor does the decision appear to have been made
"solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and[] for the exclusive purpose of[] providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" as
required by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court's order 1s AFFIRMED.
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